sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx | 65 +++++++---------------------------------------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
New commits:
commit fb2078addcbd96662283b2481206eee7ce3d50b6
Author: Stephan Bergmann <sberg...@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Dec 19 16:47:13 2011 +0100
Clean up previous commit.
diff --git a/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx b/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx
index 6b2407a..949121f 100644
--- a/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx
+++ b/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx
@@ -101,73 +101,14 @@ namespace /* private */
pStat->uValidFields |= osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes;
}
- inline void set_file_access_rights(const struct stat& file_stat, int S_IR,
int S_IW, int S_IX, oslFileStatus* pStat)
- {
- /* we cannot really map osl_File_Attribute_ReadOnly to
- the Unix access rights, it's a Windows only flag
- that's why the following hack. We set osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes
- but if there is no read access for a file we clear the flag
- again to signal to the caller that there are no file attributes
- to read because that's better than to give them incorrect one.
- */
- pStat->uValidFields |= osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes;
-
- if ((0 == (S_IW & file_stat.st_mode)) && (S_IR & file_stat.st_mode))
- pStat->uAttributes |= osl_File_Attribute_ReadOnly;
-
- if (S_IX & file_stat.st_mode)
- pStat->uAttributes |= osl_File_Attribute_Executable;
- }
-
- /* a process may belong to up to NGROUPS_MAX groups, so when
- checking group access rights, we have to check all belonging
- groups */
- inline bool is_in_process_grouplist(const gid_t file_group)
- {
- // check primary process group
-
- if (getgid() == file_group)
- return true;
-
- // check supplementary process groups
-
- gid_t grplist[NGROUPS_MAX];
- int grp_number = getgroups(NGROUPS_MAX, grplist);
-
- for (int i = 0; i < grp_number; i++)
- {
- if (grplist[i] == file_group)
- return true;
- }
- return false;
- }
-
- /* Currently we are determining the file access right based
- on the real user ID not the effective user ID!
- We don't use access(...) because access follows links which
- may cause performance problems see #97133.
+ /* This code used not to use access(...) because access follows links which
+ may cause performance problems see #97133. (That apparently references
a
+ no-longer accessible Hamburg-internal bug-tracking system.)
+ However, contrary to what is stated above the use of access calls is
+ required on network file systems not using unix semantics (AFS, see
+ fdo#43095).
*/
- inline void set_file_access_rights(const struct stat& file_stat,
oslFileStatus* pStat)
- {
- if (getuid() == file_stat.st_uid)
- {
- set_file_access_rights(file_stat, S_IRUSR, S_IWUSR, S_IXUSR,
pStat);
- }
- else if (is_in_process_grouplist(file_stat.st_gid))
- {
- set_file_access_rights(file_stat, S_IRGRP, S_IWGRP, S_IXGRP,
pStat);
- }
- else
- {
- set_file_access_rights(file_stat, S_IROTH, S_IWOTH, S_IXOTH,
pStat);
- }
- }
-
- /* contrary to what is stated above the use of access calls
- is required on network file systems not using unix semantics
- (AFS)
- */
- inline void set_file_access_real_rights(const rtl::OUString& file_path,
oslFileStatus* pStat)
+ inline void set_file_access_rights(const rtl::OUString& file_path,
oslFileStatus* pStat)
{
pStat->uValidFields |= osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes;
@@ -193,15 +134,10 @@ namespace /* private */
set_file_hidden_status(file_path, pStat);
set_file_access_mask(file_stat, pStat);
-#ifdef FAKE_ACCESS_RIGHTS
// we set the file access rights only on demand
// because it's potentially expensive
if (uFieldMask & osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes)
- set_file_access_rights(file_stat, pStat);
-#else
- if (uFieldMask & osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes)
- set_file_access_real_rights(file_path, pStat);
-#endif
+ set_file_access_rights(file_path, pStat);
}
inline void set_file_access_time(const struct stat& file_stat,
oslFileStatus* pStat)
commit 32a6a0891fb5f2d893cca656cd44afd0bcbe3272
Author: Moritz Bechler <mbech...@eenterphace.org>
Date: Mon Dec 19 16:36:31 2011 +0100
fdo#43095: allow the use of real access() calls
diff --git a/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx b/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx
index 674e603..6b2407a 100644
--- a/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx
+++ b/sal/osl/unx/file_stat.cxx
@@ -163,6 +163,22 @@ namespace /* private */
}
}
+ /* contrary to what is stated above the use of access calls
+ is required on network file systems not using unix semantics
+ (AFS)
+ */
+ inline void set_file_access_real_rights(const rtl::OUString& file_path,
oslFileStatus* pStat)
+ {
+ pStat->uValidFields |= osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes;
+
+ if (access_u(file_path.pData, W_OK) < 0)
+ pStat->uAttributes |= osl_File_Attribute_ReadOnly;
+
+ if (access_u(file_path.pData, X_OK) == 0)
+ pStat->uAttributes |= osl_File_Attribute_Executable;
+ }
+
+
inline void set_file_hidden_status(const rtl::OUString& file_path,
oslFileStatus* pStat)
{
pStat->uAttributes =
osl::systemPathIsHiddenFileOrDirectoryEntry(file_path) ?
osl_File_Attribute_Hidden : 0;
@@ -177,10 +193,15 @@ namespace /* private */
set_file_hidden_status(file_path, pStat);
set_file_access_mask(file_stat, pStat);
+#ifdef FAKE_ACCESS_RIGHTS
// we set the file access rights only on demand
// because it's potentially expensive
if (uFieldMask & osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes)
set_file_access_rights(file_stat, pStat);
+#else
+ if (uFieldMask & osl_FileStatus_Mask_Attributes)
+ set_file_access_real_rights(file_path, pStat);
+#endif
}
inline void set_file_access_time(const struct stat& file_stat,
oslFileStatus* pStat)
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