On 12/14/21 23:46, Jim Fehlig wrote:
Set a launch secret in guest memory using the sev-inject-launch-secret
QMP API. Only supported for SEV-enabled guests in a paused state.

Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfeh...@suse.com>
---
  src/qemu/qemu_driver.c       | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c      | 14 ++++++
  src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h      |  7 +++
  src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++
  src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h |  6 +++
  tests/qemumonitorjsontest.c  |  3 ++
  6 files changed, 163 insertions(+)


Just checking - not active day to day, but this technology is what some of my team works on now... I only realized this because Dan pointed it out and I was trying to help someone new on my team see how commands are created in libvirt. He's more familiar with sevctl processing, but will need to contribute to libvirt/qemu in the coming months.

diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index aae622ea5d..889892a097 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -20070,6 +20070,93 @@ qemuDomainGetLaunchSecurityInfo(virDomainPtr domain,
      return ret;
  }
+
+static int
+qemuDomainSetLaunchSecurityState(virDomainPtr domain,
+                                 virTypedParameterPtr params,
+                                 int nparams,
+                                 unsigned int flags)
+{
+    virQEMUDriver *driver = domain->conn->privateData;
+    virDomainObj *vm;
+    int ret = -1;
+    int rc;
+    size_t i;
+    g_autofree char *secrethdr = NULL;
+    g_autofree char *secret = NULL;
+    unsigned long long setaddr = 0;
+    bool hasSetaddr = false;
+    int state;
+
+    virCheckFlags(0, -1);
+    if (virTypedParamsValidate(params, nparams,
+                               VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_HEADER,
+                               VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING,
+                               VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET,
+                               VIR_TYPED_PARAM_STRING,
+                               
VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_SET_ADDRESS,
+                               VIR_TYPED_PARAM_ULLONG,
+                               NULL) < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (!(vm = qemuDomainObjFromDomain(domain)))
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (virDomainSetLaunchSecurityStateEnsureACL(domain->conn, vm->def) < 0)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    /* Currently only SEV is supported */
+    if (!vm->def->sec ||
+        vm->def->sec->sectype != VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV) {
+        virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_UNSUPPORTED, "%s",
+                       _("setting a launch secret is only supported in SEV-enabled 
domains"));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }

Would we need a specific capability check here before calling sev-inject-launch-secret since it's only available since qemu-6.0?

Seems to me VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV would be keyed off the presence of the sev-guest object only. That would seem to be a qemu 2.12 type check. It's been a while since I looked at sources, so I'm rusty, but I think qemu_validate.c/qemuValidateDomainDef would check for QEMU_CAPS_SEV_GUEST only.

This is unlike the query-sev-capabilities and query-sev-launch-measure which are present in 2.12.

John

+
+    for (i = 0; i < nparams; i++) {
+        virTypedParameterPtr param = &params[i];
+
+        if (STREQ(param->field, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_HEADER)) 
{
+            secrethdr = g_strdup(param->value.s);
+        } else if (STREQ(param->field, VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET)) 
{
+            secret = g_strdup(param->value.s);
+        } else if (STREQ(param->field, 
VIR_DOMAIN_LAUNCH_SECURITY_SEV_SECRET_SET_ADDRESS)) {
+            setaddr =  param->value.ul;
+            hasSetaddr = true;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (qemuDomainObjBeginJob(driver, vm, QEMU_JOB_MODIFY) < 0)
+        goto cleanup;
+
+    if (virDomainObjCheckActive(vm) < 0)
+        goto endjob;
+
+    state = virDomainObjGetState(vm, NULL);
+    if (state != VIR_DOMAIN_PAUSED) {
+        virReportError(VIR_ERR_OPERATION_INVALID,
+                       "%s", _("domain must be in a paused state"));
+        goto endjob;
+    }
+
+    qemuDomainObjEnterMonitor(driver, vm);
+    rc = qemuMonitorSetLaunchSecurityState(QEMU_DOMAIN_PRIVATE(vm)->mon,
+                                           secrethdr, secret, setaddr, 
hasSetaddr);
+    qemuDomainObjExitMonitor(driver, vm);
+    if (rc < 0)
+        goto endjob;
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+ endjob:
+    qemuDomainObjEndJob(driver, vm);
+
+ cleanup:
+    virDomainObjEndAPI(&vm);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+
  static const unsigned int qemuDomainGetGuestInfoSupportedTypes =
      VIR_DOMAIN_GUEST_INFO_USERS |
      VIR_DOMAIN_GUEST_INFO_OS |
@@ -20943,6 +21030,7 @@ static virHypervisorDriver qemuHypervisorDriver = {
      .domainAuthorizedSSHKeysSet = qemuDomainAuthorizedSSHKeysSet, /* 6.10.0 */
      .domainGetMessages = qemuDomainGetMessages, /* 7.1.0 */
      .domainStartDirtyRateCalc = qemuDomainStartDirtyRateCalc, /* 7.2.0 */
+    .domainSetLaunchSecurityState = qemuDomainSetLaunchSecurityState, /* 8.0.0 
*/
  };
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c
index dda6ae9796..5272d49c2e 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.c
@@ -4379,6 +4379,20 @@ qemuMonitorGetSEVInfo(qemuMonitor *mon,
  }
+int
+qemuMonitorSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+                                  const char *secrethdr,
+                                  const char *secret,
+                                  unsigned long long setaddr,
+                                  bool hasSetaddr)
+{
+    QEMU_CHECK_MONITOR(mon);
+
+    return qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState(mon, secrethdr, secret,
+                                                 setaddr, hasSetaddr);
+}
+
+
  int
  qemuMonitorGetPRManagerInfo(qemuMonitor *mon,
                              GHashTable **retinfo)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h
index 29746f0b8e..87826e6268 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor.h
@@ -1454,6 +1454,13 @@ qemuMonitorGetSEVInfo(qemuMonitor *mon,
      ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(1) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(2) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3)
      ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(4) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(5);
+int
+qemuMonitorSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+                                  const char *secrethdr,
+                                  const char *secret,
+                                  unsigned long long setaddr,
+                                  bool hasSetaddr);
+
  typedef struct _qemuMonitorPRManagerInfo qemuMonitorPRManagerInfo;
  struct _qemuMonitorPRManagerInfo {
      bool connected;
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c
index a3d6eca569..37ee859a33 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.c
@@ -8262,6 +8262,51 @@ qemuMonitorJSONGetSEVInfo(qemuMonitor *mon,
  }
+/**
+ * Set a launch secret in guest memory
+ *
+ * Example JSON:
+ *
+ * { "execute" : "sev-inject-launch-secret",
+ *   "data": { "packet-header": "str", "secret": "str", "gpa": "uint64" } }
+ *
+ * The guest physical address (gpa) parameter is optional
+ */
+int
+qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+                                      const char *secrethdr,
+                                      const char *secret,
+                                      unsigned long long setaddr,
+                                      bool hasSetaddr)
+{
+    g_autoptr(virJSONValue) cmd = NULL;
+    g_autoptr(virJSONValue) reply = NULL;
+
+    if (hasSetaddr) {
+        cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("sev-inject-launch-secret",
+                                         "s:packet-header", secrethdr,
+                                         "s:secret", secret,
+                                         "U:gpa", setaddr,
+                                         NULL);
+    } else {
+        cmd = qemuMonitorJSONMakeCommand("sev-inject-launch-secret",
+                                         "s:packet-header", secrethdr,
+                                         "s:secret", secret,
+                                         NULL);
+    }
+    if (cmd == NULL)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (qemuMonitorJSONCommand(mon, cmd, &reply) < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    if (qemuMonitorJSONCheckError(cmd, reply) < 0)
+        return -1;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
  /*
   * Example return data
   *
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h
index e88dfc9d50..64d9ebdaa3 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_monitor_json.h
@@ -476,6 +476,12 @@ qemuMonitorJSONGetVersion(qemuMonitor *mon,
                            char **package)
      ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(2) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(3) ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL(4);
+int qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState(qemuMonitor *mon,
+                                          const char *secrethdr,
+                                          const char *secret,
+                                          unsigned long long setaddr,
+                                          bool hasSetaddr);
+
  int
  qemuMonitorJSONGetMachines(qemuMonitor *mon,
                             qemuMonitorMachineInfo ***machines)
diff --git a/tests/qemumonitorjsontest.c b/tests/qemumonitorjsontest.c
index 1b0bd0870d..48e2a457ab 100644
--- a/tests/qemumonitorjsontest.c
+++ b/tests/qemumonitorjsontest.c
@@ -1196,6 +1196,8 @@ GEN_TEST_FUNC(qemuMonitorJSONSetAction,
                QEMU_MONITOR_ACTION_REBOOT_RESET,
                QEMU_MONITOR_ACTION_WATCHDOG_SHUTDOWN,
                QEMU_MONITOR_ACTION_PANIC_SHUTDOWN)
+GEN_TEST_FUNC(qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState, "sev_secret_header",
+              "sev_secret", 0, true)
static int
  testQemuMonitorJSONqemuMonitorJSONNBDServerStart(const void *opaque)
@@ -3067,6 +3069,7 @@ mymain(void)
      DO_TEST_GEN(qemuMonitorJSONJobComplete);
      DO_TEST_GEN(qemuMonitorJSONBlockJobCancel);
      DO_TEST_GEN(qemuMonitorJSONSetAction);
+    DO_TEST_GEN(qemuMonitorJSONSetLaunchSecurityState);
      DO_TEST(qemuMonitorJSONGetBalloonInfo);
      DO_TEST(qemuMonitorJSONGetBlockInfo);
      DO_TEST(qemuMonitorJSONGetAllBlockStatsInfo);


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