Good morning,
Thanks for the reply to my email and for the very helpful suggestions. Eltoo is a very attractive solution and I've already spent the last days studying it. With the regards of your queries, I’m trying to solve the inadvertent publication of revoked commitment transactions, and a remediation that can avoid the channel termination penalty. My solution aims to keep the remediation inside the Lightning network, avoiding time and cost of an additional on-chain transaction. I’m looking forward to finding more into the Eltoo documentation, and the possibilities provided by contingent payments. Margherita ________________________________ Da: [email protected] <[email protected]> per conto di Alejandro Ranchal Pedrosa <[email protected]> Inviato: mercoledì 24 ottobre 2018 10:37:36 A: [email protected] Oggetto: Re: [Lightning-dev] The problem of false positives for double spend attacks Hi Margherita, can you be a bit more specific about what you mean by double-spend attacks?. A double-spend is not an attack that can be performed acting solely on the Lightning Network, and as far as I know there are no nodes being banned because of this. If there are nodes that are being banned for tampering or sending wrong information on the p2p Lightning Network (such as changing channel_announcements or creating others that are wrong) is something I am not completely sure (maybe in some implementations? or is it specified in BOLT). In any case, this is not a double-spending attack. Best, Alejandro. On 24/10/2018 00:18, Margherita Favaretto wrote: Dear Lighning-dev group, I am Margherita Favaretto, a Master student of Cyber Security at the Technical University of Denamark (DTU). I'm currently in San Francisco for one month, to advance with my academic research on Lightning Network by taking part to the networking events that are happening here. My research is focused on a remediation protocol for Lightning Network double-spend attacks. More in detail, my research wants to mitigate the problem of false positives (e.g. software errors). Today, attacking nodes get excluded from the network, without any distinction between a software bug or an "Eve" malicious node. The solution, that I'm calling a "trusted remediation" gossip protocol, wants to solve: the identification of a false positive; the communication to other nodes; and the remediation payments mechanism. I would really appreciate an open feedback about the relevance of this issue, and which is the best way to be in contact with you. Your help would help me to focus my research on the right issues, and open a discussion about my assumptions and the related work that could help me. The goal is to give my contribution to this project and be actively part of the group as an independent researcher. Any thoughts/suggestions are really appreciated. I'm available for possible collaborations outside of this scope with people interested on this research topic. Thank you in advance, Margherita Favaretto _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
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