Good morning Orfeas, The thread is now off-topic, thus I changed the subject.
> > This can be made "the same" by any of the following methods: > > > > - Burning the up-front fees. > > This would impose a hard maximum of 21 * 10^6 * 10^8 global lifetime hops, > and a much lower practical one. PoW OTOH doesn't impose such limits. Hence > different dynamics. Granted, but do note that we can trivially "move the decimal". Perhaps not "trivially" but it is possible to do so, thus still the same overall dynamics. > > > - Locking the up-front fees for a time, then reverting them to the > > original sender. > > This means that I can burst-spam today, wait until unlock, repeat. If the PoW > scheme somehow enforces fresh PoWs (e.g. by needing (nonce || recent block > hash) as proof), I can't do this attack. But in order for PoW to actively limit spam, the PoW target must be high enough that you can burst-spam today, wait until you get your *next* passes-the-threshold PoW, repeat. The difference is that PoW has more variance, but that variance itself can limit non-spam usage (in much the same way that too high an up-front locktime would also limit non-spam usage). I do not think you can get better than this, given the physics of this universe. Money represents the allocation of available energy (by the simple mechanism of purchasing energy using money; the invisible hand is really the mechanism which directs energy towards the production of goods that are demanded), and PoW is a proof that somebody allocated available energy for the production of the PoW. I do not know what argument you would consider "formal enough" but that is the only argument I have, and I find it sufficient. Would this be enough? We postulate that there is an amount of energy E, whose consumption produces a proof-of-work we can present on network, and that this required amount of consumed energy E is sufficient to deter spam. The proof-of-work attesting to this energy E can be bought in a sufficiently mature market, using money, and thus this amount of energy E has some equivalent market price of money M, the spending of which is sufficient to deter spam. If spending amount M was not sufficient to deter spam, or equivalently if M is too cheap to deter spam, then spammers will spend M to get E to drive proof-of-work instead of deriving their proof-of-work directly, increasing demand for energy until the market price of E becomes M' such that M' is sufficiently high enough to deter spam. Or in simpler terms: with a stable enough monetary system and market, you can buy PoW, thus PoW and fees are equivalent. Regards, ZmnSCPxj _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
