Good morning Nadav, > I could be missing something, but it seems to me like the proposal to close > channels after a soft timeout unless non-cooperation can be proven upstream > adds a cost to the attacker of two on-chain transactions, which they can > immediately revoke (as they know both pieces to the revocation priv key), but > still allows very long lock-ups of other's funds (with a 10x multiplier if > they choose a long route). I do think that this is certainly an improvement > on what we have now but I'm not sure it properly punishes the attacker in its > current form.
Ah, right, E knows the revocation for the unilateral close of EE, because it is a self-channel, sigh. And by this revocation clause it can claim the money immediately and put it into a channel as well. Regards, ZmnSCPxj _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list [email protected] https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
