Hey Ankit, The lightning network sees the possession of a preimage as a proof of payment. And I believe everyone agrees that a court should rule in favor of A forcing E to deliver the good or reimburse A. The reason is that possession of the preimage matching the signed payment hash from E is a much stronger evidence of A actually having paid than E claiming to not have received anything. This is also due to the fact that guessing the preimage can practically be considered impossible (though there is a tiny likelihood)
If E breaches the protocol by giving the preimage to C (for free) instead of claiming the money from D (and thus settling the Htlc) it will be considered E's problem, that E did not get reimbursed but just gave out the preimage for free. (actually E's so called "partner in crime" did get reimbursed). Even if D would testify that E never settled the Htlc one would wonder why E never settled the incoming htlc as they should only have created a payment hash for which they know the preimage. Since A can actually provide one it is again unlikely if E for example claims they just used a random hash for which they didn't know the preimage because they wanted to just see if A has enough liquidity. With kind regards Rene Ankit Gangwal <[email protected]> schrieb am Fr., 17. Juli 2020, 08:43: > Consider A wants to send some funds to E. > > > > They don’t have a direct payment channel among them. So, they use a > following path A-B-C-D-E. A is the sender of payment and E is final > recipient. > > > > E sends the hash of a secret r to A, A passes on the hash to B, B to C, C > to D, and D to E. > > > > E discloses the secret to C (a partner in crime with E) and E do not > respond to D. C gives the secret to B (settling the HTLC between them). > Then, B gives the secret to A (settling the HTLC between them). > > > > A sent (and lost) the money, as E denies receiving the money (and the > promised service/good). > > > > How the lightening network sees this? Out of their control? > > > > -- > > A_G > > > _______________________________________________ > Lightning-dev mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev >
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