Hello Bastien,

Thank you for the clarification; indeed I might not have been clear
about the fact that senders need to understand the new fields.

What you are suggesting (solution 2, blacklisting non-cooperative
clients and playing with the mempool) is prone to griefing attacks and
it requires manpower and infrastructure not necessarily affordable by
small companies. I would also be surprised if that is the approach
used by ACINQ.

I believe pre-payment of the mining fee can be combined with 0-conf;
I am not sure why you picture them as opposed? Even with BOLT-12, I
don't see 0-conf going away.

We have not implemented BOLT-12 yet in Electrum. Would you care to
describe whether bundled payments already would work with the current
specification, or whether they would require changes to BOLT-12? We
are going to implement BOLT-12 support in Electrum in the coming
months, and I would be happy to help here.

I believe that it will take years *after it is merged*, until BOLT-12
actually becomes the dominant payment method on Lightning. OTOH, if
this feature was adopted in BOLT-11, I think it could be deployed much
faster.

The goal of my proposal is to level the field of competition between
Lightning service providers, by allowing reverse submarine swap
payments to come from any wallet (of course, a dedicated client will
still be needed to verify the redeem script and the invoice, and to
sweep the funds, as discussed above), and by allowing JIT channels to
be provided by companies who do not distribute a dedicated wallet that
trusts them.

In this context, making this proposal happen earlier rather than later
could have a significant impact on the shape of the ecosystem. It
remains to be seen how this is understood by everybody.

cheers,

Thomas





On 15.06.23 11:01, Bastien TEINTURIER wrote:
Hi Thomas,

First of all, I'd like to highlight something that may not be obvious
from your email, and is actually pretty important: your proposal
requires *senders* to be aware that the payment will lead to a channel
creation (or a splice) on the *receiver* end. In particular, it requires
all existing software used by senders to be updated. For this reason, I
think extending Bolt 12 (which requires new sender code anyway) makes
more sense than updating Bolt 11.

I see only three strategies to provide JIT liquidity (by opening a new
channel or making a splice, I'll only use the open channel case below
for simplicity):

1. Ask receiver for the preimage and a fee, then open a channel and
    push the HTLC amount minus the fee
2. Open a channel, then forward the HTLC amount minus a fee
3. Pre-pay fee, then open a channel and forward the whole HTLC amount
    on that channel

What is currently deployed on the network is 1) and 2), while you're
proposing 3). Both 1) and 2) have the advantages that the sender doesn't
need to be aware that JIT liquidity is happening, and doesn't need to do
anything special for that payment, which is the main reason those
strategies were chosen.

If all you're concerned about is trust and regulation, solution 2) works
fine as long as the mempool isn't empty: if the user doesn't release the
preimage after you've opened the channel, you should just blacklist that
channel, reject payments made to it, and double-spend it whenever you
have another on-chain transaction to make (and use 1 sat/byte for JIT
liquidity transactions). Even if the mempool is empty, if your LSP has
transactions to make at every block, it's likely that it will succeed
at double-spending the faulty channel, and thus won't lose anything.

But I agree that this only works when coupled with 0-conf. If we're not
using 0-conf anymore, pre-paying fees would make more sense. But we will
likely keep on using 0-conf at least until Bolt 12 is deployed, so it
seems more reasonable to include this new feature in Bolt 12 rather than
Bolt 11, since all implementations are actively working on this?

Cheers,
Bastien

Le jeu. 15 juin 2023 à 10:52, Thomas Voegtlin <thom...@electrum.org> a
écrit :

Hello Matt,

I think it is not too late to add a new feature to BOLT-11. In any
case, the belief that BOLT-11 is ossified should not be a reason to
make interactive something that fundamentally does not require more
interactivity than what BOLT-11 already offers. Technical decisions
should be dictated by technical needs, and I am a minimalist when it
comes to adding new messages to protocols.

I believe that two major implementations have an incentive to support
this proposal (although I cannot speak for them):
   - Lightning Labs could potentially offer their Loop service to
     non-LND users.
   - ACINQ would be able to open channels to Phoenix users without
     requesting the preimage first. This would put them on the safe side
     of the upcoming MICA regulation; I cannot emphasize enough how
     important that is.

In addition, you could certainly decide to support that feature in
LDK, and I can speak for Electrum :-)

It is the first time I suggest a change to the Lightning protocol, and
what I am proposing is really a tiny change. All we need is a new
invoice feature, that describes the prepayment of a fee using a
different preimage. This feature does not need to be set on all
invoices, and it could be made optional during a transition period.

Here is how that feature could possibly made optional:
   - a new feature bit is defined, BUNDLE_PREPAYMENT
   - two extra fields are defined: prepayment_amount, prepayment_hash
   - if the sender does not support BUNDLE_PREPAYMENT and the feature is
     optional, it ignores the new fields
   - if the sender support BUNDLE_PREPAYMENT:
      - sender sends (amount - prepayment_amount) with payment_hash
      - sender sends prepayment_amount with prepayment_hash

The decision to make this feature required or optional remains with
the service provider. I can see how submarine swap providers who are
already exposed to the mining fee griefing attack could decide to make
it optional for a transition period.

cheers,
Thomas


Regarding your question (a) about the distinction between splice-out
and submarine swaps: Submarine swaps make it possible to add receiving
capacity to a channel.




On 14.06.23 19:28, Matt Corallo wrote:
I think the ship has probably sailed on getting any kind of new
interoperable change in to BOLT-11.

We already can't get amount-less BOLT-11 invoices broadly supported,
rolling out yet another new incompatible version of BOLT-11 and expecting
the entire ecosystem to support it doesn't seem all that likely.

If we're working towards specifying some "standard" way of doing swaps,
(a) I'd be curious to understand why the need isn't obviated by splice-out,
and (b) why it shouldn't be built on OMs so you can do it more privately.

Matt

On 6/13/23 1:10 AM, Thomas Voegtlin wrote:
Good morning list,

I would like to propose an extension to BOLT-11, where an invoice can
contain two bundled payments, with distinct preimages and amounts.

The use case is for services that require the prepayment of a mining
fee in order for a non-custodian exchange to take place:
   - Submarine swaps
   - JIT channels

In both cases, the service provider receives a HTLC for which they do
not have the preimage, have to send funds on-chain (to the channel or
submarine swap funding address), and wait for the client to reveal the
preimage when they claim the payment. Because there is no guarantee that
the client will actually claim the payment, the service providers need to
ask prepayment of mining fees.

In the case of submarine swaps, services that use dedicated client
software, such as Loop by Lightning Labs, can ask for a prepayment, because
their software can handle it (this is called "no show penalty" on the Loop
website). However, competitors who do require a dedicated wallet, not such
as the Boltz exchange, cannot do that. Their website shows an invoice to
the user, whose wallet that is agnostic about the swap, and it would be
unpractical for them to show two invoices to be paid simultaneously. This
creates a situation where Boltz is vulnerable to DoS attacks, where the
attacker forces them to pay on-chain fees.

In the case of JIT channels, providers who want to protect themselves
against this mining fee attack need to ask the preimage of the main payment
before they open the channel. I believe this is what Phoenix does (although
their pay-to-open service is not open-source, so I cannot really check).
The issue is that a service that asks for the preimage first becomes
custodian. From a legal perspective, it does not matter whether they open
the channel immediately after receiving the preimage, the ordering of
events makes their service custodian. In Europe, such a service will fall
within the European MICA regulation. Competitors who refuse to offer
custodian services, such as Electrum, are excluded from that game.

In order to solve that, it would be beneficial to bundle the prepayment
and the main payment in the same BOLT-11 invoice.

The semantics of bundled payments is as follows:
   - 1. the BOLT-11 invoice contains two preimages and two amounts:
prepayment and main payment.
   - 2. the receiver should wait until all the HTLCs of both payments
have arrived, before they fulfill the HTLCs of the pre-payment. If the main
payment does not arrive, they should fail the pre-payment with a MPP
timeout.
   - 3. once the HTLCs of both payments have arrived, the receiver
fulfills the HTLCs of the prepayment, and they broadcast their on-chain
transaction. Note that the main payment can still fail if the sender never
reveal the preimage of the main payment.

Of course, nothing in my proposal prevents the service provider from
stealing the pre-payment, but that is already the case today.

I believe this proposal would level the field in terms of competition
between lightning service providers. Currently, you need to use a dedicated
client in order to use Loop, and competitors who do not have an established
user base running a dedicated client are exposed to the mining fee attack.
I also believe that ACINQ would benefit from this, because it would make it
possible for them to make their pay-to-open service fully non-custodian. My
understanding is that in its current form, the 'pay-to-open' service used
by Phoenix will fall into the scope of the European MICA regulation, which
they should consider as a serious issue.

Finally, I believe that such a change should be implemented in BOLT-11,
and not using BOLT-12 or onion messages. Indeed, my proposal does not
require the exchange of new messages. Some of the initial feedback I
received was that this is a use case for BOLT-12 or OM, but I think that
this is making things unnecessarily complicated. We should not add new
messages when things can be done in a non-interactive way.

Cheers,
ThomasV
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