> As the CLTV > delta deadline approaches, the fees in case 2 may be 50%, 80%, even > 100% of the HTLC value under such a scorched earth policy.
A replacement-cycling attacker can afford to pay 100% of the HTLC value under the defender scorched earth policy and still realize an economic gain. Let's say you have Alice, Bob and Caroll all "honest" routing hops targeted by an attacker. They all have 3 independent 10 000 sats HTLC in-flight on their outbound channels. Under this defensive fee scorched earth policy, Alice broadcasts her HTLC-timeout at T + 1 with 10 000 sats committed as absolute fee. It is replaced by Mallory at T+2 with a HTLC-preimage X of 200 000 sats (+ rbf penalty 1 sat / vb rule 4). Alice's HTLC-timeout is out of network mempools. Bob broadcasts her HTLC-timeout of 200 000 sats at T+3. It is replaced by Mallory at T+4 with her HLTC-preimage Y of 200 000 sats (+ rbf penalty 1 sat / vb rule 4 * 2). Bob's HTLC-timeout is out of network mempools. HTLC-preimage Y conflicts with HTLC-preimage X too (here comes the multiplied by 2 of the rbf penalty). Caroll broadcasts her HTLC-timeout of 200 000 sats at T+5. It is replaced by Mallory at T+6 with her HTLC-preimage Z of 200 000 sats (+rbf penalty 1 sat / vb rule 4 * 3). Caroll's HTLC-timeout is out of network mempools. HTLC-preimage Z conflicts with HTLC-preimage Z too (here comes the multiplied by 3 of rbf penalty). At any time if Mallory's HTLC-preimage enters into the top mempool feerates group (due to the accumulated rbf penalty), one unconfirmed ancestor can be double-spent to evict out the HTLC-preimage. If Mallory succeeds the replacement cycling, she might be at loss of 10 000 sats + rbf penalty cost for each rebroadcast attempt of the victim. However she wins Alice + Bob + Carol HTLC value of 200 000 sats each. Assuming 5 rebroadcasts per block (even on random timers) multiplied by 3 victims, 200 bytes of HTLC-preimage and cltv_delta of 144 blocks, the total attacker cost is 432 000 sats. The economic gain realized is 168 000 sats. Sounds each additional victim has a cost of 144 000 sats, whatever the HTLC value targeted. Thanks for checking the fees math and replacement rules, though it sounds correct to me. (And here without introducing more favorable assumptions to the attacker, like mempool spikes where the "honest" HTLC-timeout transactions can be let floating in network mempools). Best, Antoine Le jeu. 19 oct. 2023 à 18:54, Matt Morehouse <mattmoreho...@gmail.com> a écrit : > On Thu, Oct 19, 2023 at 5:22 PM Antoine Riard <antoine.ri...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > > > Hi Matt, > > > > This mitigation is mentioned in the attached paper (see subsection 3.4 > defensive fee-rebroadcasting) > > > https://github.com/ariard/mempool-research/blob/2023-10-replacement-paper/replacement-cycling.pdf > > > > As soon as you start to have a bit of a mempool backlog and the > defensive fractional fee HTLC-timeout stays stuck, it gives the advantage > to the attacker again. > > > > Beyond that, I think an attacker can replace-cycle multiple honest > HTLC-timeout with a single malicious HTLC-preimage (with a sequence of > replacement, not concurrently) paying the absolute fee, while only > encumbering the RBF penalty. I didn't test this specific behavior, though > the "fees" math doesn't seem at the advantage of the defenders at first > sight. > > Right, some replacement cycles can be avoided by the attacker to > reduce the cost of the attack. But with the defender implementing a > scorched-earth fee bumping policy, eventually either (1) the > HTLC-timeout *will* confirm in the next block or (2) the attacker must > pay more fees than the HTLC-timeout fees to replace it. As the CLTV > delta deadline approaches, the fees in case 2 may be 50%, 80%, even > 100% of the HTLC value under such a scorched earth policy. So even if > the attacker only has to do one replacement cycle right before the > deadline, the attack can be made unprofitable. And in practice, with > HTLC values significantly greater than the next-block fee cost, the > attacker will need to do multiple replacements as the deadline > approaches. > > And of course this linear scorched earth policy is just an > illustration. We should further tune the fee bumping curve across the > full CLTV delta to ensure minimal fees paid when not under attack. > But as we approach the deadline, it makes sense to become very > aggressive both to get our transaction confirmed during high mempool > congestion and to punish replacement-cycling attackers. > > > > > Best, > > Antoine > > > > Le jeu. 19 oct. 2023 à 17:23, Matt Morehouse <mattmoreho...@gmail.com> > a écrit : > >> > >> On Wed, Oct 18, 2023 at 12:34 AM Matt Corallo via bitcoin-dev > >> <bitcoin-...@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote: > >> > > >> > There appears to be some confusion about this issue and the > mitigations. To be clear, the deployed > >> > mitigations are not expected to fix this issue, its arguable if they > provide anything more than a PR > >> > statement. > >> > > >> > There are two discussed mitigations here - mempool scanning and > transaction re-signing/re-broadcasting. > >> > > >> > Mempool scanning relies on regularly checking the mempool of a local > node to see if we can catch the > >> > replacement cycle mid-cycle. It only works if wee see the first > transaction before the second > >> > transaction replaces it. > >> > > >> > Today, a large majority of lightning nodes run on machines with a > Bitcoin node on the same IP > >> > address, making it very clear what the "local node" of the lightning > node is. An attacker can > >> > trivially use this information to connect to said local node and do > the replacement quickly, > >> > preventing the victim from seeing the replacement. > >> > > >> > More generally, however, similar discoverability is true for mining > pools. An attacker performing > >> > this attack is likely to do the replacement attack on a miner's node > directly, potentially reducing > >> > the reach of the intermediate transaction to only miners, such that > the victim can never discover it > >> > at all. > >> > > >> > The second mitigation is similarly pathetic. Re-signing and > re-broadcasting the victim's transaction > >> > in an attempt to get it to miners even if its been removed may work, > if the attacker is super lazy > >> > and didn't finish writing their attack system. If the attacker is > connected to a large majority of > >> > hashrate (which has historically been fairly doable), they can simply > do their replacement in a > >> > cycle aggressively and arbitrarily reduce the probability that the > victim's transaction gets confirmed. > >> > >> What if the honest node aggressively fee-bumps and retransmits the > >> HTLC-timeout as the CLTV delta deadline approaches, as suggested by > >> Ziggie? Say, within 10 blocks of the deadline, the honest node starts > >> increasing the fee by 1/10th the HTLC value for each non-confirmation. > >> > >> This "scorched earth" approach may cost the honest node considerable > >> fees, but it will cost the attacker even more, since each attacker > >> replacement needs to burn at least as much as the HTLC-timeout fees, > >> and the attacker will need to do a replacement every time the honest > >> node fee bumps. > >> > >> I think this fee-bumping policy will provide sufficient defense even > >> if the attacker is replacement-cycling directly in miners' mempools > >> and the victim has no visibility into the attack. > >> > >> > > >> > Now, the above is all true in a spherical cow kinda world, and the > P2P network has plenty of slow > >> > nodes and strange behavior. Its possible that these mitigations > might, by some stroke of luck, > >> > happen to catch such an attack and prevent it, because something took > longer than the attacker > >> > intended or whatever. But, that's a far cry from any kind of material > "fix" for the issue. > >> > > >> > Ultimately the only fix for this issue will be when miners keep a > history of transactions they've > >> > seen and try them again after they may be able to enter the mempool > because of an attack like this. > >> > > >> > Matt > >> > > >> > On 10/16/23 12:57 PM, Antoine Riard wrote: > >> > > (cross-posting mempool issues identified are exposing lightning > chan to loss of funds risks, other > >> > > multi-party bitcoin apps might be affected) > >> > > > >> > > Hi, > >> > > > >> > > End of last year (December 2022), amid technical discussions on > eltoo payment channels and > >> > > incentives compatibility of the mempool anti-DoS rules, a new > transaction-relay jamming attack > >> > > affecting lightning channels was discovered. > >> > > > >> > > After careful analysis, it turns out this attack is practical and > immediately exposed lightning > >> > > routing hops carrying HTLC traffic to loss of funds security risks, > both legacy and anchor output > >> > > channels. A potential exploitation plausibly happening even without > network mempools congestion. > >> > > > >> > > Mitigations have been designed, implemented and deployed by all > major lightning implementations > >> > > during the last months. > >> > > > >> > > Please find attached the release numbers, where the mitigations > should be present: > >> > > - LDK: v0.0.118 - CVE-2023 -40231 > >> > > - Eclair: v0.9.0 - CVE-2023-40232 > >> > > - LND: v.0.17.0-beta - CVE-2023-40233 > >> > > - Core-Lightning: v.23.08.01 - CVE-2023-40234 > >> > > > >> > > While neither replacement cycling attacks have been observed or > reported in the wild since the last > >> > > ~10 months or experimented in real-world conditions on bitcoin > mainet, functional test is available > >> > > exercising the affected lightning channel against bitcoin core > mempool (26.0 release cycle). > >> > > > >> > > It is understood that a simple replacement cycling attack does not > demand privileged capabilities > >> > > from an attacker (e.g no low-hashrate power) and only access to > basic bitcoin and lightning > >> > > software. Yet I still think executing such an attack successfully > requests a fair amount of bitcoin > >> > > technical know-how and decent preparation. > >> > > > >> > > From my understanding of those issues, it is yet to be determined > if the mitigations deployed are > >> > > robust enough in face of advanced replacement cycling attackers, > especially ones able to combine > >> > > different classes of transaction-relay jamming such as pinnings or > vetted with more privileged > >> > > capabilities. > >> > > > >> > > Please find a list of potential affected bitcoin applications in > this full disclosure report using > >> > > bitcoin script timelocks or multi-party transactions, albeit no > immediate security risk exposure as > >> > > severe as the ones affecting lightning has been identified. Only > cursory review of non-lightning > >> > > applications has been conducted so far. > >> > > > >> > > There is a paper published summarizing replacement cycling attacks > on the lightning network: > >> > > > https://github.com/ariard/mempool-research/blob/2023-10-replacement-paper/replacement-cycling.pdf > >> > > < > https://github.com/ariard/mempool-research/blob/2023-10-replacement-paper/replacement-cycling.pdf > > > >> > > > >> > > ## Problem > >> > > > >> > > A lightning node allows HTLCs forwarding (in bolt3's parlance > accepted HTLC on incoming link and > >> > > offered HTLC on outgoing link) should settle the outgoing state > with either a success or timeout > >> > > before the incoming state timelock becomes final and an asymmetric > defavorable settlement might > >> > > happen (cf "Flood & Loot: A Systematic Attack on The Lightning > Network" section 2.3 for a classical > >> > > exposition of this lightning security property). > >> > > > >> > > Failure to satisfy this settlement requirement exposes a forwarding > hop to a loss of fund risk where > >> > > the offered HTLC is spent by the outgoing link counterparty's > HTLC-preimage and the accepted HTLC is > >> > > spent by the incoming link counterparty's HTLC-timeout. > >> > > > >> > > The specification mandates the incoming HTLC expiration timelock to > be spaced out by an interval of > >> > > `cltv_expiry_delta` from the outgoing HTLC expiration timelock, > this exact interval value being an > >> > > implementation and node policy setting. As a minimal value, the > specification recommends 34 blocks > >> > > of interval. If the timelock expiration I of the inbound HTLC is > equal to 100 from chain tip, the > >> > > timelock expiration O of the outbound HTLC must be equal to 66 > blocks from chain tip, giving a > >> > > reasonable buffer of reaction to the lightning forwarding node. > >> > > > >> > > In the lack of cooperative off-chain settlement of the HTLC on the > outgoing link negotiated with the > >> > > counterparty (either `update_fulfill_htlc` or `update_fail_htlc`) > when O is reached, the lightning > >> > > node should broadcast its commitment transaction. Once the > commitment is confirmed (if anchor and > >> > > the 1 CSV encumbrance is present), the lightning node broadcasts > and confirms its HTLC-timeout > >> > > before I height is reached. > >> > > > >> > > Here enter a replacement cycling attack. A malicious channel > counterparty can broadcast its > >> > > HTLC-preimage transaction with a higher absolute fee and higher > feerate than the honest HTLC-timeout > >> > > of the victim lightning node and triggers a replacement. Both for > legacy and anchor output channels, > >> > > a HTLC-preimage on a counterparty commitment transaction is > malleable, i.e additional inputs or > >> > > outputs can be added. The HTLC-preimage spends an unconfirmed and > unrelated to the channel parent > >> > > transaction M and conflicts its child. > >> > > > >> > > As the HTLC-preimage spends an unconfirmed input that was already > included in the unconfirmed and > >> > > unrelated child transaction (rule 2), pays an absolute higher fee > of at least the sum paid by the > >> > > HTLC-timeout and child transaction (rule 3) and the HTLC-preimage > feerate is greater than all > >> > > directly conflicting transactions (rule 6), the replacement is > accepted. The honest HTLC-timeout is > >> > > evicted out of the mempool. > >> > > > >> > > In an ulterior move, the malicious counterparty can replace the > parent transaction itself with > >> > > another candidate N satisfying the replacement rules, triggering > the eviction of the malicious > >> > > HTLC-preimage from the mempool as it was a child of the parent T. > >> > > > >> > > There is no spending candidate of the offered HTLC output for the > current block laying in network > >> > > mempools. > >> > > > >> > > This replacement cycling tricks can be repeated for each > rebroadcast attempt of the HTLC-timeout by > >> > > the honest lightning node until expiration of the inbound HTLC > timelock I. Once this height is > >> > > reached a HTLC-timeout is broadcast by the counterparty's on the > incoming link in collusion with the > >> > > one on the outgoing link broadcasting its own HTLC-preimage. > >> > > > >> > > The honest Lightning node has been "double-spent" in its HTLC > forwarding. > >> > > > >> > > As a notable factor impacting the success of the attack, a > lightning node's honest HTLC-timeout > >> > > might be included in the block template of the miner winning the > block race and therefore realizes a > >> > > spent of the offered output. In practice, a replacement cycling > attack might over-connect to miners' > >> > > mempools and public reachable nodes to succeed in a fast eviction > of the HTLC-timeout by its > >> > > HTLC-preimage. As this latter transaction can come with a better > ancestor-score, it should be picked > >> > > up on the flight by economically competitive miners. > >> > > > >> > > A functional test exercising a simple replacement cycling of a HTLC > transaction on bitcoin core > >> > > mempool is available: > >> > > https://github.com/ariard/bitcoin/commits/2023-test-mempool > >> > > <https://github.com/ariard/bitcoin/commits/2023-test-mempool> > >> > > > >> > > ## Deployed LN mitigations > >> > > > >> > > Aggressive rebroadcasting: As the replacement cycling attacker > benefits from the HTLC-timeout being > >> > > usually broadcast by lightning nodes only once every block, or less > the replacement cycling > >> > > malicious transactions paid only equal the sum of the absolute fees > paid by the HTLC, adjusted with > >> > > the replacement penalty. Rebroadcasting randomly and multiple times > before the next block increases > >> > > the absolute fee cost for the attacker. > >> > > > >> > > Implemented and deployed by Eclair, Core-Lightning, LND and LDK . > >> > > > >> > > Local-mempool preimage monitoring: As the replacement cycling > attacker in a simple setup broadcast > >> > > the HTLC-preimage to all the network mempools, the honest lightning > node is able to catch on the > >> > > flight the unconfirmed HTLC-preimage, before its subsequent mempool > replacement. The preimage can be > >> > > extracted from the second-stage HTLC-preimage and used to fetch the > off-chain inbound HTLC with a > >> > > cooperative message or go on-chain with it to claim the accepted > HTLC output. > >> > > > >> > > Implemented and deployed by Eclair and LND. > >> > > > >> > > CLTV Expiry Delta: With every jammed block comes an absolute fee > cost paid by the attacker, a risk > >> > > of the HTLC-preimage being detected or discovered by the honest > lightning node, or the HTLC-timeout > >> > > to slip in a winning block template. Bumping the default CLTV delta > hardens the odds of success of a > >> > > simple replacement cycling attack. > >> > > > >> > > Default setting: Eclair 144, Core-Lightning 34, LND 80 and LDK 72. > >> > > > >> > > ## Affected Bitcoin Protocols and Applications > >> > > > >> > > From my understanding the following list of Bitcoin protocols and > applications could be affected by > >> > > new denial-of-service vectors under some level of network mempools > congestion. Neither tests or > >> > > advanced review of specifications (when available) has been > conducted for each of them: > >> > > - on-chain DLCs > >> > > - coinjoins > >> > > - payjoins > >> > > - wallets with time-sensitive paths > >> > > - peerswap and submarine swaps > >> > > - batch payouts > >> > > - transaction "accelerators" > >> > > > >> > > Inviting their developers, maintainers and operators to investigate > how replacement cycling attacks > >> > > might disrupt their in-mempool chain of transactions, or > fee-bumping flows at the shortest delay. > >> > > Simple flows and non-multi-party transactions should not be > affected to the best of my understanding. > >> > > > >> > > ## Open Problems: Package Malleability > >> > > > >> > > Pinning attacks have been known for years as a practical vector to > compromise lightning channels > >> > > funds safety, under different scenarios (cf. current bip331's > motivation section). Mitigations at > >> > > the mempool level have been designed, discussed and are under > implementation by the community > >> > > (ancestor package relay + nverrsion=3 policy). Ideally, they should > constraint a pinning attacker to > >> > > always attach a high feerate package (commitment + CPFP) to replace > the honest package, or allow a > >> > > honest lightning node to overbid a malicious pinning package and > get its time-sensitive transaction > >> > > optimistically included in the chain. > >> > > > >> > > Replacement cycling attack seem to offer a new way to neutralize > the design goals of package relay > >> > > and its companion nversion=3 policy, where an attacker package RBF > a honest package out of the > >> > > mempool to subsequently double-spend its own high-fee child with a > transaction unrelated to the > >> > > channel. As the remaining commitment transaction is pre-signed with > a minimal relay fee, it can be > >> > > evicted out of the mempool. > >> > > > >> > > A functional test exercising a simple replacement cycling of a > lightning channel commitment > >> > > transaction on top of the nversion=3 code branch is available: > >> > > https://github.com/ariard/bitcoin/commits/2023-10-test-mempool-2 > >> > > <https://github.com/ariard/bitcoin/commits/2023-10-test-mempool-2> > >> > > > >> > > ## Discovery > >> > > > >> > > In 2018, the issue of static fees for pre-signed lightning > transactions is made more widely known, > >> > > the carve-out exemption in mempool rules to mitigate in-mempool > package limits pinning and the > >> > > anchor output pattern are proposed. > >> > > > >> > > In 2019, bitcoin core 0.19 is released with carve-out support. > Continued discussion of the anchor > >> > > output pattern as a dynamic fee-bumping method. > >> > > > >> > > In 2020, draft of anchor output submitted to the bolts. Initial > finding of economic pinning against > >> > > lightning commitment and second-stage HTLC transactions. Subsequent > discussions of a > >> > > preimage-overlay network or package-relay as mitigations. Public > call made to inquiry more on > >> > > potential other transaction-relay jamming attacks affecting > lightning. > >> > > > >> > > In 2021, initial work in bitcoin core 22.0 of package acceptance. > Continued discussion of the > >> > > pinning attacks and shortcomings of current mempool rules during > community-wide online workshops. > >> > > Later the year, in light of all issues for bitcoin second-layers, a > proposal is made about killing > >> > > the mempool. > >> > > > >> > > In 2022, bip proposed for package relay and new proposed v3 policy > design proposed for a review and > >> > > implementation. Mempoolfullrbf is supported in bitcoin core 24.0 > and conceptual questions about > >> > > alignment of mempool rules w.r.t miners incentives are investigated. > >> > > > >> > > Along this year 2022, eltoo lightning channels design are > discussed, implemented and reviewed. In > >> > > this context and after discussions on mempool anti-DoS rules, I > discovered this new replacement > >> > > cycling attack was affecting deployed lightning channels and > immediately reported the finding to > >> > > some bitcoin core developers and lightning maintainers. > >> > > > >> > > ## Timeline > >> > > > >> > > - 2022-12-16: Report of the finding to Suhas Daftuar, Anthony > Towns, Greg Sanders and Gloria Zhao > >> > > - 2022-12-16: Report to LN maintainers: Rusty Russell, Bastien > Teinturier, Matt Corallo and Olaoluwa > >> > > Osuntunkun > >> > > - 2022-12-23: Sharing to Eugene Siegel (LND) > >> > > - 2022-12-24: Sharing to James O'Beirne and Antoine Poinsot > (non-lightning potential affected projects) > >> > > - 2022-01-14: Sharing to Gleb Naumenko (miners incentives and > cross-layers issuers) and initial > >> > > proposal of an early public disclosure > >> > > - 2022-01-19: Collection of analysis if other second-layers and > multi-party applications affected. > >> > > LN mitigations development starts. > >> > > - 2023-05-04: Sharing to Wilmer Paulino (LDK) > >> > > - 2023-06-20: LN mitigations implemented and progressively > released. Week of the 16 october proposed > >> > > for full disclosure. > >> > > - 2023-08-10: CVEs assigned by MITRE > >> > > - 2023-10-05: Pre-disclosure of LN CVEs numbers and replacement > cycling attack existence to > >> > > secur...@bitcoincore.org <mailto:secur...@bitcoincore.org>. > >> > > - 2023-10-16: Full disclosure of CVE-2023-40231 / CVE-2023-40232 / > CVE-2023-40233 / CVE-2023-40234 > >> > > and replacement cycling attacks > >> > > > >> > > ## Conclusion > >> > > > >> > > Despite the line of mitigations adopted and deployed by current > major lightning implementations, I > >> > > believe replacement cycling attacks are still practical for > advanced attackers. Beyond this new > >> > > attack might come as a way to partially or completely defeat some > of the pinning mitigations which > >> > > have been working for years as a community. > >> > > > >> > > As of today, it is uncertain to me if lightning is not affected by > a more severe long-term package > >> > > malleability critical security issue under current consensus rules, > and if any other time-sensitive > >> > > multi-party protocol, designed or deployed isn't de facto affected > too (loss of funds or denial of > >> > > service). > >> > > > >> > > Assuming analysis on package malleability is correct, it is unclear > to me if it can be corrected by > >> > > changes in replacement / eviction rules or mempool chain of > transactions processing strategy. > >> > > Inviting my technical peers and the bitcoin community to look more > on this issue, including to > >> > > dissent. I'll be the first one pleased if I'm fundamentally wrong > on those issues, or if any element > >> > > has not been weighted with the adequate technical accuracy it > deserves. > >> > > > >> > > Do not trust, verify. All mistakes and opinions are my own. > >> > > > >> > > Antoine > >> > > > >> > > "meet with Triumph and Disaster. And treat those two impostors just > the same" - K. > >> > > > >> > > _______________________________________________ > >> > > Lightning-dev mailing list > >> > > Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org > >> > > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev > >> > _______________________________________________ > >> > bitcoin-dev mailing list > >> > bitcoin-...@lists.linuxfoundation.org > >> > https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev >
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