Actually we're in agreement; as you put it, a %100 secure system is beyond the means of most people.
So I'll 'rephrase what I wrote earlier : "Although theoretically possible, real world considerations are such that a %100 secure publicly- accessible webserver that is within the financial means of most website owners is not possible and nothing will stop a committed hacker who wants access to your system". Sorry for the confusion. Now that you mention it, though, what I meant was that context is everything. Wikipedia can ill-afford to deploy Lilypond for good reasons it has given, but those reasons needn't apply to people like me and others who have expressed an interest in deploying lilypond on a webserver on an experimental basis. I think somebody with modest-to-good linux skills can deploy a system that is reasonably secure and by that I mean it can escape detection by the bot scripts that scour the net for trivially hackable systems. As long as it's not on a public server - and by that I mean one that contains other websites and info - I think it's doable. I know I tried it on a small basis; I had some pople try to hack it and they said stuff like 'I don't know how much time you want me to spend on this but the standard kiddie stuff can't get through". I ran it in a jail, removed anything that might be useful to someone who even gained root access, I had Tripwire installed to monitor all files, I had the replacement libc libraries installed (the ones that monitor for attempted bufferoverflow exploits) and so on. So I think someone who wants to experiment with it shouldn't be dissuaded by the reasons given by the people from Wikipedia. We should deploy it experimentally, ensure nobody can use the systems to disrupt other systems and - here's the key part - learn from it. My beer's getting warm - Cheers, Mike On Fri, May 22, 2009 at 8:43 AM, Graham Percival <gra...@percival-music.ca>wrote: > On Thu, May 21, 2009 at 02:47:54PM -0400, Mike Blackstock wrote: > > Of course, 'security' is relative - nothing will stop a commited > > hacker who's targeted your system, so I'm a bit mystified by > > some of the other responses here. > > That's not true -- The only reason that computer security is a > joke is that people *treat* it like a joke. It's entirely > possible to create a system that will foil a committed hacker. > > Now, does this involve a lot of work? Certainly. And consumers > willing to pay to have this work done? Definitely not! But that > doesn't mean that computer programs are some magical black box > that anybody can break. Barring random bit-flipping from solar > rays, computers are deterministic objects. > > > By "a lot of work", suppose that all programmers (and academics) > stopped implementing new features and new programs in 1994, and > spent the past 15 years just improving security. How many holes > do you think would be left in the result? > > Cheers, > - Graham >
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