Quoting Eric Paris (epa...@redhat.com): > On Tue, 2013-12-10 at 10:51 -0600, Serge Hallyn wrote: > > Quoting Gao feng (gaof...@cn.fujitsu.com): > > > On 12/10/2013 02:26 AM, Serge Hallyn wrote: > > > > Quoting Gao feng (gaof...@cn.fujitsu.com): > > > >> On 12/07/2013 06:12 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > >>> Quoting Gao feng (gaof...@cn.fujitsu.com): > > > >>>> Hi > > > >>>> > > > >>>> On 10/24/2013 03:31 PM, Gao feng wrote: > > > >>>>> Here is the v1 patchset: http://lwn.net/Articles/549546/ > > > >>>>> > > > >>>>> The main target of this patchset is allowing user in audit > > > >>>>> namespace to generate the USER_MSG type of audit message, > > > >>>>> some userspace tools need to generate audit message, or > > > >>>>> these tools will broken. > > > >>>>> > > > >>>> > > > >>>> I really need this feature, right now,some process such as > > > >>>> logind are broken in container becase we leak of this feature. > > > >>> > > > >>> Your set doesn't address loginuid though right? How exactly do you > > > >>> expect to do that? If user violates MAC policy and audit msg is > > > >>> sent to init user ns by mac subsys, you need the loginuid from > > > >>> init_audit_ns. where will that be stored if you allow updates > > > >>> of loginuid in auditns? > > > >>> > > > >> This patchset doesn't include the loginuid part. > > > >> > > > >> the loginuid is stored in task as before. > > > >> In my opinion, when task creates a new audit namespace, this task's > > > >> loginuid will be reset to zero, so the children tasks can set their > > > >> loginuid. Does this change break the MAC? > > > > > > > > I think so, yes. In an LSPP selinux environment, if the task > > > > manages to trigger an selinux deny rule which is audited, then > > > > the loginuid must make sense on the host. Now presumably it > > > > will get translated to the mapped host uid, and we can figure > > > > out the host uid owning it through /etc/subuid. But that adds > > > > /etc/subuid as a new part of the TCB without any warning <shrug> > > > > So in that sense, for LSPP, it breaks it. > > > > > > > > > > Looks like my opinion is incorrect. > > > > > > In the audit-next tree, Eric added a new audit feature to allow privileged > > > user to disable AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE. after AUDIT_LOGINUID_IMMUTABLE > > > is disabled, the privileged user can reset/set the loginuid of task. I > > > think this way is safe since only privileged user can do the change. > > > > > > So I will not change the loginuid part. > > > > > > Thanks for your information Serge :) > > > > Unfortunately this makes the patchset much less compelling :) The > > problem I was looking into is that a container running in a user > > namespace cannot (bc he has ns_capable(CAP_AUDIT_*) but not > > capable(CAP_AUDIT_*)) set loginuids at all. > > > > Which from an LSPP pov is correct; which is why I was hoping you were > > going to have the audit namespaces be hierarchical, with a task in a > > level 2 audit ns having two loginuids - one in his own auditns, and > > one in the initial one. > > Right now user namespace + audit is just total crud. We all know > this... (I'm not sure pid is must better, but I digress) All thoughts > around loginuid in the kernel right this very moment only make sense in > the initial user namespace and all permission checks are in the initial > user namespace as well. > > I think I'm a proponent of the hierarchical approach to audit > namespaces. An audit namespace would hold a reference to the > pid/user/whatever namespace it was created in/with. Each audit > namespace should have it's own set of filter rules, etc. Instead of > just storing 'loginuid' we store 'loginuid+user namespace'. When the
So long as the kernel stores the kuid_t (which the only sane thing to do) that is a non-issue. > kernel creates a record it should translate the loginuid to the > namespace of the audit namespace and send the record. Yup, that should go without saying. Use kuid_t in kernel and translate at the kernel-user boundary. > It's a pretty major rewrite, but at least it makes sense. Things like > AVC's might show up in multiple audit logs, but in every log they would > make sense to the admin of that namespace... > > But what the hell do I know... Exactly how it would all affect selinux. I'm happy it seems we agree. > Namespaces scare me... -serge -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
