On Fri, Aug 24, 2018 at 8:33 PM John Stultz <john.stu...@linaro.org> wrote: > On Fri, Aug 24, 2018 at 5:00 AM, Ondrej Mosnacek <omosn...@redhat.com> wrote: > > This patch adds two auxiliary record types that will be used to annotate > > the adjtimex SYSCALL records with the NTP/timekeeping values that have > > been changed. > > > > Next, it adds two functions to the audit interface: > > - audit_tk_injoffset(), which will be called whenever a timekeeping > > offset is injected by a syscall from userspace, > > - audit_ntp_adjust(), which will be called whenever an NTP internal > > variable is changed by a syscall from userspace. > > > > Quick reference for the fields of the new records: > > AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET > > sec - the 'seconds' part of the offset > > nsec - the 'nanoseconds' part of the offset > > AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL > > op - which value was adjusted: > > offset - corresponding to the time_offset variable > > freq - corresponding to the time_freq variable > > status - corresponding to the time_status variable > > adjust - corresponding to the time_adjust variable > > tick - corresponding to the tick_usec variable > > tai - corresponding to the timekeeping's TAI offset > > old - the old value > > new - the new value > > > > Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosn...@redhat.com> > > --- > > include/linux/audit.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ > > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ > > kernel/auditsc.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ > > 3 files changed, 38 insertions(+) > > > > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > > index 9334fbef7bae..0d084d4b4042 100644 > > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > > @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ > > #include <linux/sched.h> > > #include <linux/ptrace.h> > > #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> > > +#include <uapi/linux/timex.h> > > > > #define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1) > > #define AUDIT_DEV_UNSET ((dev_t)-1) > > @@ -356,6 +357,8 @@ extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, > > const struct cred *old); > > extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags); > > extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name); > > extern void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response); > > +extern void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset); > > +extern void __audit_ntp_adjust(const char *type, s64 oldval, s64 newval); > > > > static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) > > { > > @@ -458,6 +461,18 @@ static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int > > response) > > __audit_fanotify(response); > > } > > > > +static inline void audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset) > > +{ > > + if (!audit_dummy_context()) > > + __audit_tk_injoffset(offset); > > +} > > + > > +static inline void audit_ntp_adjust(const char *type, s64 oldval, s64 > > newval) > > +{ > > + if (!audit_dummy_context()) > > + __audit_ntp_adjust(type, oldval, newval); > > +} > > + > > extern int audit_n_rules; > > extern int audit_signals; > > #else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */ > > @@ -584,6 +599,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name) > > static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) > > { } > > > > +static inline void audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset) > > +{ } > > + > > +static inline void audit_ntp_adjust(const char *type, s64 oldval, s64 > > newval) > > +{ } > > + > > static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t) > > { } > > #define audit_n_rules 0 > > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > index 4e3eaba84175..242ce562b41a 100644 > > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > > @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ > > #define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet > > unanswerd */ > > #define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330 /* Kernel Module events */ > > #define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331 /* Fanotify access decision */ > > +#define AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET 1332 /* Timekeeping offset injected */ > > +#define AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL 1333 /* NTP value adjustment */ > > > > #define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */ > > #define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */ > > diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c > > index fb207466e99b..d355d32d9765 100644 > > --- a/kernel/auditsc.c > > +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c > > @@ -2422,6 +2422,21 @@ void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response) > > AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response); > > } > > > > +/* We need to allocate with GFP_ATOMIC here, since these two functions > > will be > > + * called while holding the timekeeping lock: */ > > +void __audit_tk_injoffset(struct timespec64 offset) > > +{ > > + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_TIME_INJOFFSET, > > + "sec=%lli nsec=%li", (long long)offset.tv_sec, > > offset.tv_nsec); > > +} > > + > > +void __audit_ntp_adjust(const char *type, s64 oldval, s64 newval) > > +{ > > + audit_log(audit_context(), GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_TIME_ADJNTPVAL, > > + "op=%s old=%lli new=%lli", type, > > + (long long)oldval, (long long)newval); > > +} > > So it looks like you've been careful here, but just want to make sure, > nothing in the audit_log path calls anything that might possibly call > back into timekeeping code? We've had a number of issues over time > where debug calls out to other subsystems end up getting tweaked to > add some timestamping and we deadlock. :)
Hm, that's a good point... AFAIK, the only place where audit_log() might call into timekeeping is when it captures the timestamp for the record (via ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64()), but this is only called when the functions are called outside of a syscall and that should never happen here. I'm thinking I could harden this more by returning early from these functions if WARN_ON_ONCE(!audit_context() || !audit_context()->in_syscall)... It is not a perfect solution, but at least there will be something in the code reminding us about this issue. > > One approach we've done to make sure we don't create a trap for future > changes in other subsystems, is avoid calling into other subsystems > until later when we've dropped the locks, (see clock_was_set). Its a > little rough for some of the things done deep in the ntp code, but > might be an extra cautious approach to try. I'm afraid that delaying the audit_* calls would complicate things too much here... Paul/Richard, any thoughts? -- Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace at redhat dot com> Associate Software Engineer, Security Technologies Red Hat, Inc. -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit