On 2020-06-08 14:53, Lakshmi Ramasubramanian wrote:
> The final log statement in process_buffer_measurement() for failure
> condition is at debug level. This does not log the message unless
> the system log level is raised which would significantly increase
> the messages in the system log. Change this log message to an audit
> message for better triaging failures in the function.
> 
> ima_alloc_key_entry() does not log a message for failure condition.
> Add an audit message for failure condition in this function.
> 
> Sample audit messages:
> 
> [    8.051937] audit: type=1804 audit(1591633422.365:8): pid=1 uid=0 
> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 
> op=measuring_keys cause=hashing_error(-22) comm="systemd" 
> name=".builtin_trusted_keys" res=0
> 
> [    8.063218] audit: type=1804 audit(1591633422.377:9): pid=1 uid=0 
> auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 subj=system_u:system_r:init_t:s0 
> op=measuring_kexec_cmdline cause=alloc_entry(-12) comm="systemd" 
> name="kexec-cmdline" res=0
> 
> Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nra...@linux.microsoft.com>

Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <r...@redhat.com>

> ---
>  security/integrity/ima/ima.h            |  2 ++
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c       | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++----
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c      |  2 --
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c |  4 +++
>  4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index df93ac258e01..8a47249c6238 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
>  
>  #define NR_BANKS(chip) ((chip != NULL) ? chip->nr_allocated_banks : 0)
>  
> +#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
> +
>  /* current content of the policy */
>  extern int ima_policy_flag;
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 800fb3bba418..b10f09bc7eca 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -739,6 +739,9 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size,
>                               int pcr, const char *keyring)
>  {
>       int ret = 0;
> +     const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
> +     const char *op = "measuring_keys";
> +     char measurement_audit_cause[AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX];
>       struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
>       struct integrity_iint_cache iint = {};
>       struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
> @@ -793,21 +796,43 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int 
> size,
>       iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
>  
>       ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, iint.ima_hash);
> -     if (ret < 0)
> +     if (ret < 0) {
> +             audit_cause = "hashing_error";
>               goto out;
> +     }
>  
>       ret = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
> -     if (ret < 0)
> +     if (ret < 0) {
> +             audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
>               goto out;
> +     }
>  
>       ret = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, buf, pcr);
> -
> -     if (ret < 0)
> +     if (ret < 0) {
> +             audit_cause = "store_entry";
>               ima_free_template_entry(entry);
> +     }
>  
>  out:
> -     if (ret < 0)
> -             pr_devel("%s: failed, result: %d\n", __func__, ret);
> +     if (ret < 0) {
> +             snprintf(measurement_audit_cause, AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX,
> +                      "%s(%d)", audit_cause, ret);
> +
> +             switch (func) {
> +             case KEXEC_CMDLINE:
> +                     op = "measuring_kexec_cmdline";
> +                     break;
> +             case KEY_CHECK:
> +                     op = "measuring_keys";
> +                     break;
> +             default:
> +                     op = "measuring_blacklisted_hash";
> +                     break;
> +             }
> +
> +             integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, eventname,
> +                                 op, measurement_audit_cause, ret, 0);
> +     }
>  
>       return;
>  }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> index fb4ec270f620..4a761d765c6c 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
> @@ -19,8 +19,6 @@
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
>  #include "ima.h"
>  
> -#define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
> -
>  /* pre-allocated array of tpm_digest structures to extend a PCR */
>  static struct tpm_digest *digests;
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
> index cb3e3f501593..4de31ff172aa 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c
> @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key 
> *keyring,
>                                                size_t payload_len)
>  {
>       int rc = 0;
> +     const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
>       struct ima_key_entry *entry;
>  
>       entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
> @@ -88,6 +89,9 @@ static struct ima_key_entry *ima_alloc_key_entry(struct key 
> *keyring,
>  
>  out:
>       if (rc) {
> +             integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL,
> +                                 keyring->description, "measuring_keys",
> +                                 audit_cause, rc, 0);
>               ima_free_key_entry(entry);
>               entry = NULL;
>       }
> -- 
> 2.27.0
> 
> 
> --
> Linux-audit mailing list
> Linux-audit@redhat.com
> https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit

- RGB

--
Richard Guy Briggs <r...@redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635

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