Hello Paul, On Thursday, February 25, 2021 5:28:11 PM EST Paul Moore wrote: > On Thu, Feb 25, 2021 at 5:15 PM Steve Grubb <sgr...@redhat.com> wrote: > > Hello, > > > > There was an announcement on the oss-security mail list a week ago: > > > > https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2021/q1/155 > > > > regarding auditing of the open_by_handle_at system call ... > > The *at() syscalls are a known issue with respect to audit; we have a > few open GH issues related to the topic, the oldest appears to be the > one below: > > * https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/9 Yes, that is true. But this is a bit different because at least those *at functions get triggered by -F perm=xrwa. Should one or both of the syscalls be added to the filter? And name_to_handle_at() appears to be yet another kernel system call who's arg4 has something that is security relevant.
So, it looks like there are probably 3 work items: 1) add syscall(s) to the perm filter, 2) add an auxiliary record to grab the arg4 flags variable, 3) add to the list of functions that have *at path resolution issues. -Steve > > ... In any event, they are asking what upstream audit is going to do > > about this? > I recognize it sounds a bit trite here, but "patches are always > welcome". Basically someone needs to have the time and motivation to > look into this and put forth some patches that we can discuss and > iterate over. The problem is that historically audit has attracted > very few kernel developers outside the occasional development push by > a distro preparing a OS release for a certification effort. I was > just lamenting this fact on a private mail thread with some other > kernel developers a couple of weeks ago ... -- Linux-audit mailing list Linux-audit@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit