On 12/21/2012 07:42 AM, Jeff Liu wrote:
> Hi Goffredo,
>
> On 12/21/2012 04:18 AM, Goffredo Baroncelli wrote:
>> HI Jeff,
>>
>> On 12/20/2012 09:43 AM, Jeff Liu wrote:
>>> With the new ioctl(2) BTRFS_IOC_GET_FSLABEL we can fetch the label of a
>>> mounted file system.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Jie Liu <jeff....@oracle.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Anand Jain <anand.j...@oracle.com>
>>> Cc: Miao Xie <mi...@cn.fujitsu.com>
>>> Cc: Goffredo Baroncelli <kreij...@inwind.it>
>>> Cc: David Sterba <dste...@suse.cz>
>> [...]
>>> +static int btrfs_ioctl_get_fslabel(struct file *file, void __user *arg)
>>> +{
>>> + struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(fdentry(file)->d_inode)->root;
>>> + const char *label = root->fs_info->super_copy->label;
>>> + int ret;
>>> +
>>> + mutex_lock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
>>> + ret = copy_to_user(arg, label, strlen(label));
>>
>> Sorry for pointing out my doubt too late, but should we trust
>> super_copy->label ?
>> An user could insert a usb-key with a btrfs filesystem with a label
>> without zero. In this case strlen() could access outside
>> super_copy->label[].
> Thank you for letting me be aware of this situation.
>
> First of all, if the user set label via btrfs tools, he can not make it
> length exceeding BTRFS_LABLE_SIZE - 1.
>
> If the user does that through codes wrote by himself like:
> btrfslabel.c->set_label_unmounted(), he can do that.
> However, it most likely he did that for evil purpose or any other reasons?
I think the most likely case is the "evil purpose".
>>
>> I think that it should be quite easy to alter artificially a filesystem
>> to crash the kernel. So I not consider this as big problem. However *in
>> case* of a further cycle of this patch I suggest to replace strlen()
>> with strnlen().
> I don't think we should replace strlen() with strnlen() since it's
> totally wrong if the length of label is more than BTRFS_LABEL_SIZE -1,
> we can not just truncating the label and return it in this case.
This for me is sufficient, or we could copy all the label buffer,
without further check:
copy_to_user(arg, label, BTRFS_LABEL_SIZE)
> Add BUG_ON(strlen(label) > BTRFS_LABEL_SIZE - 1) is reasonable instead.
I agree with Stefan, this is not a correct use of BUG_ON; a warning is
sufficient (there is un-correct data read from disk).
>
> Thanks,
> -Jeff
>>
>>> + mutex_unlock(&root->fs_info->volume_mutex);
>>> +
>>> + return ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int
>>> cmd, unsigned long arg)
>>> {
>>> @@ -3797,6 +3810,8 @@ long btrfs_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int
>>> return btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_create(root, argp);
>>> case BTRFS_IOC_QGROUP_LIMIT:
>>> return btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_limit(root, argp);
>>> + case BTRFS_IOC_GET_FSLABEL:
>>> + return btrfs_ioctl_get_fslabel(file, argp);
>>> }
>>>
>>> return -ENOTTY;
>>> diff --git a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.h b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.h
>>> index 731e287..5b2cbef 100644
>>> --- a/fs/btrfs/ioctl.h
>>> +++ b/fs/btrfs/ioctl.h
>>> @@ -451,6 +451,8 @@ struct btrfs_ioctl_send_args {
>>> struct btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_create_args)
>>> #define BTRFS_IOC_QGROUP_LIMIT _IOR(BTRFS_IOCTL_MAGIC, 43, \
>>> struct btrfs_ioctl_qgroup_limit_args)
>>> +#define BTRFS_IOC_GET_FSLABEL _IOR(BTRFS_IOCTL_MAGIC, 49, \
>>> + char[BTRFS_LABEL_SIZE])
>>> #define BTRFS_IOC_GET_DEV_STATS _IOWR(BTRFS_IOCTL_MAGIC, 52, \
>>> struct btrfs_ioctl_get_dev_stats)
>>> #endif
>>
>>
>
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