On Tue, Jun 14, 2022 at 01:59:08PM -0500, Frederick Lawler wrote: > On 6/14/22 11:30 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > Frederick Lawler <f...@cloudflare.com> writes: > > > > > On 6/13/22 11:44 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > > > Frederick Lawler <f...@cloudflare.com> writes: > > > > > > > > > Hi Eric, > > > > > > > > > > On 6/13/22 12:04 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > > > > > Frederick Lawler <f...@cloudflare.com> writes: > > > > > > > > > > > > > While experimenting with the security_prepare_creds() LSM hook, we > > > > > > > noticed that our EPERM error code was not propagated up the > > > > > > > callstack. > > > > > > > Instead ENOMEM is always returned. As a result, some tools may > > > > > > > send a > > > > > > > confusing error message to the user: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > $ unshare -rU > > > > > > > unshare: unshare failed: Cannot allocate memory > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A user would think that the system didn't have enough memory, when > > > > > > > instead the action was denied. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > This problem occurs because prepare_creds() and > > > > > > > prepare_kernel_cred() > > > > > > > return NULL when security_prepare_creds() returns an error code. > > > > > > > Later, > > > > > > > functions calling prepare_creds() and prepare_kernel_cred() return > > > > > > > ENOMEM because they assume that a NULL meant there was no memory > > > > > > > allocated. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Fix this by propagating an error code from > > > > > > > security_prepare_creds() up > > > > > > > the callstack. > > > > > > Why would it make sense for security_prepare_creds to return an > > > > > > error > > > > > > code other than ENOMEM? > > > > > > > That seems a bit of a violation of what that function is > > > > > > supposed to do > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The API allows LSM authors to decide what error code is returned from > > > > > the > > > > > cred_prepare hook. security_task_alloc() is a similar hook, and has > > > > > its return > > > > > code propagated. > > > > It is not an api. It is an implementation detail of the linux kernel. > > > > It is a set of convenient functions that do a job. > > > > The general rule is we don't support cases without an in-tree user. I > > > > don't see an in-tree user. > > > > > > > > > I'm proposing we follow security_task_allocs() pattern, and add > > > > > visibility for > > > > > failure cases in prepare_creds(). > > > > I am asking why we would want to. Especially as it is not an API, and I > > > > don't see any good reason for anything but an -ENOMEM failure to be > > > > supported. > > > > > > > We're writing a LSM BPF policy, and not a new LSM. Our policy aims to > > > solve > > > unprivileged unshare, similar to Debian's patch [1]. We're in a position > > > such > > > that we can't use that patch because we can't block _all_ of our > > > applications > > > from performing an unshare. We prefer a granular approach. LSM BPF seems > > > like a > > > good choice. > > > > I am quite puzzled why doesn't /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces work > > for you? > > > > We have the following requirements: > > 1. Allow list criteria > 2. root user must be able to create namespaces whenever > 3. Everything else not in 1 & 2 must be denied > > We use per task attributes to determine whether or not we allow/deny the > current call to unshare(). > > /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces limits are a bit broad for this level of > detail. > > > > Because LSM BPF exposes these hooks, we should probably treat them as an > > > API. From that perspective, userspace expects unshare to return a EPERM > > > when the call is denied permissions. > > > > The BPF code gets to be treated as a out of tree kernel module. > > > > > > Without an in-tree user that cares it is probably better to go the > > > > opposite direction and remove the possibility of return anything but > > > > memory allocation failure. That will make it clearer to implementors > > > > that a general error code is not supported and this is not a location > > > > to implement policy, this is only a hook to allocate state for the LSM. > > > > > > > > > > That's a good point, and it's possible we're using the wrong hook for the > > > policy. Do you know of other hooks we can look into?
Fwiw, from this commit it wasn't very clear what you wanted to achieve with this. It might be worth considering adding a new security hook for this. Within msft it recently came up SELinux might have an interest in something like this as well. -- Linux-cachefs mailing list Linux-cachefs@redhat.com https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-cachefs
