On Wed, 28 Sep 2011 00:28:10 +0300 Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> wrote:
> This solves a problem for where a user without write permissions > was creating empty files. This function was supposed to do a lookup > only, the create happens later. > Not quite. This uses the open-intent goop in the VFS layer that Al Viro is trying to get rid of. The idea here is that doing a lookup just to do an open is a waste, when you could just attempt the open. There's no real reason to exempt creates from that if cifs used a sane permissions model... > Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <[email protected]> > > diff --git a/fs/cifs/dir.c b/fs/cifs/dir.c > index 72d448b..8515afe 100644 > --- a/fs/cifs/dir.c > +++ b/fs/cifs/dir.c > @@ -566,11 +566,13 @@ cifs_lookup(struct inode *parent_dir_inode, struct > dentry *direntry, > if (nd && !(nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) && > (nd->flags & LOOKUP_OPEN) && !pTcon->broken_posix_open && > (nd->intent.open.file->f_flags & O_CREAT)) { > + unsigned int f_flags; > + > + f_flags = (nd->intent.open.file->f_flags & ~O_CREAT); > rc = cifs_posix_open(full_path, &newInode, > parent_dir_inode->i_sb, > nd->intent.open.create_mode, > - nd->intent.open.file->f_flags, &oplock, > - &fileHandle, xid); > + f_flags, &oplock, &fileHandle, xid); ...so this makes it only do the open at lookup time if the file already exists. I suspect the real problem here is that cifs is trying to enforce permissions on the client, which happens after the lookup. If the client simply allowed the server to handle the permissions (and used the right credentials for each user), then this would probably work fine. Another nail in the coffin for the whole model of client side permissions enforcement, IMO... In any case, this seems fine to me, so... > /* > * The check below works around a bug in POSIX > * open in samba versions 3.3.1 and earlier where Acked-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-cifs" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
