Signature verification routines for RSA crypto key subtype.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowe...@redhat.com>
---
security/keys/Makefile | 2
security/keys/crypto_rsa.h | 11 +
security/keys/crypto_rsa_subtype.c | 15 +
security/keys/crypto_rsa_verify.c | 519 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 546 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/keys/crypto_rsa_verify.c
diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile
index bde336e..78a3aa6 100644
--- a/security/keys/Makefile
+++ b/security/keys/Makefile
@@ -24,4 +24,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
crypto_keys-y := crypto_type.o pgp_parse.o crypto_verify.o
crypto_dsa-y := crypto_dsa_subtype.o crypto_dsa_verify.o
-crypto_rsa-y := crypto_rsa_subtype.o
+crypto_rsa-y := crypto_rsa_subtype.o crypto_rsa_verify.o
diff --git a/security/keys/crypto_rsa.h b/security/keys/crypto_rsa.h
index 2ec8edc..6670458 100644
--- a/security/keys/crypto_rsa.h
+++ b/security/keys/crypto_rsa.h
@@ -34,3 +34,14 @@ struct RSA_payload {
u8 key_id_size; /* Number of bytes in key_id */
struct RSA_public_key *public_key;
};
+
+/*
+ * crypto_rsa_verify.c
+ */
+extern struct crypto_key_verify_context *RSA_verify_sig_begin(
+ struct key *key, const u8 *sig, size_t siglen);
+extern int RSA_verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen);
+extern int RSA_verify_sig_end(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx,
+ const u8 *sig, size_t siglen);
+extern void RSA_verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx);
diff --git a/security/keys/crypto_rsa_subtype.c
b/security/keys/crypto_rsa_subtype.c
index da0d4cf..1eb5839 100644
--- a/security/keys/crypto_rsa_subtype.c
+++ b/security/keys/crypto_rsa_subtype.c
@@ -313,6 +313,11 @@ struct crypto_key_subtype RSA_crypto_key_subtype = {
.info = CRYPTO_KEY_IS_PUBKEY_ALGO,
.instantiate = RSA_instantiate,
.destroy = RSA_destroy,
+
+ .verify_sig_begin = RSA_verify_sig_begin,
+ .verify_sig_add_data = RSA_verify_sig_add_data,
+ .verify_sig_end = RSA_verify_sig_end,
+ .verify_sig_cancel = RSA_verify_sig_cancel,
};
struct crypto_key_subtype RSA_crypto_key_subtype_2 = {
@@ -322,6 +327,11 @@ struct crypto_key_subtype RSA_crypto_key_subtype_2 = {
.info = CRYPTO_KEY_IS_PUBKEY_ALGO,
.instantiate = RSA_instantiate,
.destroy = RSA_destroy,
+
+ .verify_sig_begin = RSA_verify_sig_begin,
+ .verify_sig_add_data = RSA_verify_sig_add_data,
+ .verify_sig_end = RSA_verify_sig_end,
+ .verify_sig_cancel = RSA_verify_sig_cancel,
};
struct crypto_key_subtype RSA_crypto_key_subtype_3 = {
@@ -331,6 +341,11 @@ struct crypto_key_subtype RSA_crypto_key_subtype_3 = {
.info = CRYPTO_KEY_IS_PUBKEY_ALGO,
.instantiate = RSA_instantiate,
.destroy = RSA_destroy,
+
+ .verify_sig_begin = RSA_verify_sig_begin,
+ .verify_sig_add_data = RSA_verify_sig_add_data,
+ .verify_sig_end = RSA_verify_sig_end,
+ .verify_sig_cancel = RSA_verify_sig_cancel,
};
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/crypto_rsa_verify.c
b/security/keys/crypto_rsa_verify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..736e2f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keys/crypto_rsa_verify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,519 @@
+/* RSA signature verification algorithm [RFC3447]
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by David Howells (dhowe...@redhat.com)
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#define DEBUG
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RSA: "fmt
+#include <keys/crypto-subtype.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/mpi.h>
+#include <linux/pgp.h>
+#include <crypto/hash.h>
+#include "crypto_rsa.h"
+#include "internal.h"
+
+struct RSA_signature {
+ struct crypto_key_verify_context base;
+ enum pgp_hash_algo hash_algo : 8;
+ u8 signed_hash_msw[2];
+ union {
+ MPI mpi[1];
+ struct {
+ MPI s; /* m^d mod n */
+ };
+ };
+ struct shash_desc hash; /* This must go last! */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Hash algorithm OIDs plus ASN.1 DER wrappings [RFC4880 sec 5.2.2].
+ */
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_MD5[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0C, 0x06, 0x08,
+ 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05, /* OID */
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA1[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x2b, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_RIPE_MD_160[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
+ 0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA224[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA256[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA384[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30
+};
+
+static const u8 RSA_digest_info_SHA512[] = {
+ 0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
+ 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
+ 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40
+};
+
+static const struct {
+ const u8 const *data;
+ size_t size;
+} RSA_ASN1_templates[PGP_HASH__LAST] = {
+#define _(X) { RSA_digest_info_##X, sizeof(RSA_digest_info_##X) }
+ [PGP_HASH_MD5] = _(MD5),
+ [PGP_HASH_SHA1] = _(SHA1),
+ [PGP_HASH_RIPE_MD_160] = _(RIPE_MD_160),
+ [PGP_HASH_SHA256] = _(SHA256),
+ [PGP_HASH_SHA384] = _(SHA384),
+ [PGP_HASH_SHA512] = _(SHA512),
+ [PGP_HASH_SHA224] = _(SHA224),
+#undef _
+};
+
+struct RSA_sig_parse_context {
+ struct pgp_parse_context pgp;
+ struct pgp_sig_parameters params;
+};
+
+static int RSA_parse_signature(struct pgp_parse_context *context,
+ enum pgp_packet_tag type,
+ u8 headerlen,
+ const u8 *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct RSA_sig_parse_context *ctx =
+ container_of(context, struct RSA_sig_parse_context, pgp);
+
+ return pgp_parse_sig_params(&data, &datalen, &ctx->params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Begin the process of verifying a RSA signature.
+ *
+ * This involves allocating the hash into which first the data and then the
+ * metadata will be put, and parsing the signature to check that it matches the
+ * key.
+ */
+struct crypto_key_verify_context *RSA_verify_sig_begin(
+ struct key *key, const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen)
+{
+ struct RSA_sig_parse_context p;
+ struct RSA_signature *sig;
+ struct crypto_shash *tfm;
+ struct RSA_payload *rsa = key->payload.data;
+ int ret;
+
+ kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(key), siglen);
+
+ if (!rsa->public_key) {
+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no public key]");
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ }
+
+ p.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE);
+ p.pgp.process_packet = RSA_parse_signature;
+ ret = pgp_parse_packets(sigdata, siglen, &p.pgp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+
+ if (p.params.pubkey_algo != PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_ENC_OR_SIG &&
+ p.params.pubkey_algo != PGP_PUBKEY_RSA_SIG_ONLY) {
+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [wrong pk algo]");
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ }
+
+ if (p.params.hash_algo >= PGP_HASH__LAST ||
+ !pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo]) {
+ kleave(" = -ENOPKG [hash]");
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG);
+ }
+
+ pr_notice("Signature generated with %s hash\n",
+ pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo]);
+
+ if (memcmp(&p.params.issuer, rsa->key_id, 8) != 0) {
+ kleave(" = -ENOKEY [wrong key ID]");
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY);
+ }
+
+ if (p.params.signature_type != PGP_SIG_BINARY_DOCUMENT_SIG &&
+ p.params.signature_type != PGP_SIG_STANDALONE_SIG) {
+ /* We don't want to canonicalise */
+ kleave(" = -EOPNOTSUPP [canon]");
+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate the hashing algorithm we're going to need and find out how
+ * big the hash operational data will be.
+ */
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_shash(pgp_hash_algorithms[p.params.hash_algo], 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm) == -ENOENT ?
+ ERR_PTR(-ENOPKG) : ERR_CAST(tfm);
+
+ /* We allocate the hash operational data storage on the end of our
+ * context data.
+ */
+ sig = kzalloc(sizeof(*sig) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sig) {
+ crypto_free_shash(tfm);
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ }
+
+ sig->base.key = key;
+ sig->hash_algo = p.params.hash_algo;
+ sig->hash.tfm = tfm;
+ sig->hash.flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
+
+ ret = crypto_shash_init(&sig->hash);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ crypto_free_shash(sig->hash.tfm);
+ kfree(sig);
+ return ERR_PTR(ret);
+ }
+
+ key_get(sig->base.key);
+ kleave(" = %p", sig);
+ return &sig->base;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load data into the hash
+ */
+int RSA_verify_sig_add_data(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ struct RSA_signature *sig =
+ container_of(ctx, struct RSA_signature, base);
+
+ return crypto_shash_update(&sig->hash, data, datalen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform the RSA signature verification.
+ * @H: Value of hash of data and metadata
+ * @EM: The computed signature value
+ * @k: The size of EM (EM[0] is an invalid location but should hold 0x00)
+ * @hash_size: The size of H
+ * @asn1_template: The DigestInfo ASN.1 template
+ * @asn1_size: Size of asm1_template[]
+ */
+static int RSA_verify(const u8 *H, const u8 *EM, size_t k, size_t hash_size,
+ const u8 *asn1_template, size_t asn1_size)
+{
+ unsigned PS_end, T_offset, i;
+
+ kenter(",,%zu,%zu,%zu", k, hash_size, asn1_size);
+
+ if (k < 2 + 1 + asn1_size + hash_size)
+ return -EBADMSG;
+
+ /* Decode the EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 */
+ if (EM[1] != 0x01) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[1] == %02u]", EM[1]);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ T_offset = k - (asn1_size + hash_size);
+ PS_end = T_offset - 1;
+ if (EM[PS_end] != 0x00) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T-1] == %02u]", EM[PS_end]);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 2; i < PS_end; i++) {
+ if (EM[i] != 0xff) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[PS%x] == %02u]", i - 2, EM[i]);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(asn1_template, EM + T_offset, asn1_size) != 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [EM[T] ASN.1 mismatch]");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(H, EM + T_offset + asn1_size, hash_size) != 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [EM[T] hash mismatch]");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+
+ kleave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+struct RSA_sig_digest_context {
+ struct pgp_parse_context pgp;
+ struct RSA_signature *sig;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Extract required metadata from the signature packet and add what we need to
+ * to the hash.
+ */
+static int RSA_digest_signature(struct pgp_parse_context *context,
+ enum pgp_packet_tag type,
+ u8 headerlen,
+ const u8 *data,
+ size_t datalen)
+{
+ enum pgp_signature_version version;
+ struct RSA_sig_digest_context *ctx =
+ container_of(context, struct RSA_sig_digest_context, pgp);
+ int i;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ version = *data;
+ if (version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_3) {
+ /* We just include an excerpt of the metadata from a V3
+ * signature.
+ */
+ crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, data + 1, 5);
+ data += sizeof(struct pgp_signature_v3_packet);
+ datalen -= sizeof(struct pgp_signature_v3_packet);
+ } else if (version == PGP_SIG_VERSION_4) {
+ /* We add the whole metadata header and some of the hashed data
+ * for a V4 signature, plus a trailer.
+ */
+ size_t hashedsz, unhashedsz;
+ u8 trailer[6];
+
+ hashedsz = 4 + 2 + (data[4] << 8) + data[5];
+ crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, data, hashedsz);
+
+ trailer[0] = version;
+ trailer[1] = 0xffU;
+ trailer[2] = hashedsz >> 24;
+ trailer[3] = hashedsz >> 16;
+ trailer[4] = hashedsz >> 8;
+ trailer[5] = hashedsz;
+
+ crypto_shash_update(&ctx->sig->hash, trailer, 6);
+ data += hashedsz;
+ datalen -= hashedsz;
+
+ unhashedsz = 2 + (data[0] << 8) + data[1];
+ data += unhashedsz;
+ datalen -= unhashedsz;
+ }
+
+ if (datalen <= 2) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ /* There's a quick check on the hash available. */
+ ctx->sig->signed_hash_msw[0] = *data++;
+ ctx->sig->signed_hash_msw[1] = *data++;
+ datalen -= 2;
+
+ /* And then the cryptographic data, which we'll need for the
+ * algorithm.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ctx->sig->mpi); i++) {
+ unsigned int remaining = datalen;
+ ctx->sig->mpi[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(data, &remaining);
+ if (!ctx->sig->mpi[i])
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ data += remaining;
+ datalen -= remaining;
+ }
+
+ if (datalen != 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [trailer %zu]", datalen);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ kleave(" = 0");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RSAVP1() function [RFC3447 sec 5.2.2]
+ */
+static int RSAVP1(struct RSA_public_key *pub, MPI s, MPI *_m)
+{
+ MPI m;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* (1) Validate 0 <= s < n */
+ if (mpi_cmp_ui(s, 0) < 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s < 0]");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (mpi_cmp(s, pub->n) >= 0) {
+ kleave(" = -EBADMSG [s >= n]");
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ m = mpi_alloc(0);
+ if (!m)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* (2) m = s^e mod n */
+ ret = mpi_powm(m, s, pub->e, pub->n);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ mpi_free(m);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ *_m = m;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Integer to Octet String conversion [RFC3447 sec 4.1]
+ */
+static int RSA_I2OSP(MPI x, size_t xLen, u8 **_X)
+{
+ unsigned X_size, x_size;
+ int X_sign;
+ u8 *X;
+
+ /* Make sure the string is the right length. The number should begin
+ * with { 0x00, 0x01, ... } so we have to account for 15 leading zero
+ * bits not being reported by MPI.
+ */
+ x_size = mpi_get_nbits(x);
+ kdebug("size(x)=%u xLen*8=%zu", x_size, xLen * 8);
+ if (x_size != xLen * 8 - 15)
+ return -ERANGE;
+
+ X = mpi_get_buffer(x, &X_size, &X_sign);
+ if (!X)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (X_sign < 0) {
+ kfree(X);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+ if (X_size != xLen - 1) {
+ kfree(X);
+ return -EBADMSG;
+ }
+
+ *_X = X;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The data is now all loaded into the hash; load the metadata, finalise the
+ * hash and perform the verification step [RFC3447 sec 8.2.2].
+ */
+int RSA_verify_sig_end(struct crypto_key_verify_context *ctx,
+ const u8 *sigdata, size_t siglen)
+{
+ struct RSA_signature *sig =
+ container_of(ctx, struct RSA_signature, base);
+ struct RSA_payload *rsa = sig->base.key->payload.data;
+ struct RSA_sig_digest_context p;
+ size_t digest_size, tsize;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Variables as per RFC3447 sec 8.2.2 */
+ void *H = NULL;
+ u8 *EM = NULL;
+ MPI m = NULL;
+ size_t k;
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ /* Firstly we add metadata, starting with some of the data from the
+ * signature packet */
+ p.pgp.types_of_interest = (1 << PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE);
+ p.pgp.process_packet = RSA_digest_signature;
+ p.sig = sig;
+ ret = pgp_parse_packets(sigdata, siglen, &p.pgp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_ctx;
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(sig->hash.tfm);
+ H = kmalloc(digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!H)
+ goto error_free_ctx;
+
+ crypto_shash_final(&sig->hash, H);
+
+ /* (1) Check the signature size against the public key modulus size */
+ k = (mpi_get_nbits(rsa->public_key->n) + 7) / 8;
+
+ tsize = (mpi_get_nbits(sig->s) + 7) / 8;
+ kdebug("step 1: k=%zu size(S)=%zu", k, tsize);
+ if (tsize != k) {
+ ret = -EBADMSG;
+ goto error_free_digest;
+ }
+
+ /* (2b) Apply the RSAVP1 verification primitive to the public key */
+ ret = RSAVP1(rsa->public_key, sig->s, &m);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_mpi;
+
+ /* (2c) Convert the message representative (m) to an encoded message
+ * (EM) of length k octets.
+ *
+ * NOTE! The leading zero byte is suppressed by MPI, so we pass a
+ * pointer to the _preceding_ byte to RSA_verify()!
+ */
+ ret = RSA_I2OSP(m, k, &EM);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto error_free_mpi;
+
+ ret = RSA_verify(H, EM - 1, k, digest_size,
+ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->hash_algo].data,
+ RSA_ASN1_templates[sig->hash_algo].size);
+
+error_free_mpi:
+ kfree(EM);
+ mpi_free(m);
+error_free_digest:
+ kfree(H);
+error_free_ctx:
+ RSA_verify_sig_cancel(ctx);
+ kleave(" = %d", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Cancel an in-progress data loading
+ */
+void RSA_verify_sig_cancel(struct crypto_key_verify_context *_ctx)
+{
+ struct RSA_signature *sig =
+ container_of(_ctx, struct RSA_signature, base);
+
+ kenter("");
+
+ /* !!! Do we need to tell the crypto layer to cancel too? */
+ crypto_free_shash(sig->hash.tfm);
+ key_put(sig->base.key);
+ mpi_free(sig->s);
+ kfree(sig);
+
+ kleave("");
+}
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