On Tue, Apr 22, 2014 at 12:30:28PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> This is unlikely to be exploitable for anything except an OOPS.
>
> Cc: sta...@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <l...@amacapital.net>
> ---
>
> Notes:
> This is entirely untested, but it looks obviously correct to me.
>
> crypto/crypto_user.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/crypto/crypto_user.c b/crypto/crypto_user.c
> index 1512e41..bc7c4b5 100644
> --- a/crypto/crypto_user.c
> +++ b/crypto/crypto_user.c
> @@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static int crypto_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb,
> struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
> int type, err;
>
> type = nlh->nlmsg_type;
> - if (type > CRYPTO_MSG_MAX)
> + if (type < CRYPTO_MSG_BASE || type > CRYPTO_MSG_MAX)
> return -EINVAL;
Adding a check here is obviously harmless but I think this is only
called from netlink_rcv_skb() which already checks:
if (nlh->nlmsg_type < NLMSG_MIN_TYPE)
goto ack;
NLMSG_MIN_TYPE is 0x10 as well, so I don't think we can hit your
condition.
Your patch freaked me out a little because this is one of the bugs that
I should have caught throught static analysis.
regards,
dan carpenter
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