On 07/17/2014 11:48 AM, Mark Kettenis wrote:
> On Thu, Jul 17, 2014, Theodore Ts'o wrote:
>>
>> The getrandom(2) system call is a superset of getentropy(2). When we
>> add the support for this into glibc, it won't be terribly difficult
>> nor annoying to drop the following in alongside the standard support
>> needed for any new system call:
>>
>> int getentropy(void *buf, size_t buflen)
>> {
>> int ret;
>>
>> ret = getentropy(buf, buflen, 0);
>> return (ret > 0) ? 0 : ret;
>> }
>
> I'm sure you meant to use getrandom() there ;)
>
> Since for LibreSSL we'd want a getentropy() that cannot fail the
> getrandom() call should use GRND_BLOCK flag. Actually it makes sense
> (to me) to make blocking the default behaviour and have a
> BRND_NONBLOCK flag. Much in the same way as you need to specify
> O_NONBLOCK if you want non-blocking behaviour for files.
>
Can we please have a mode in which getrandom(2) can neither block nor
fail? If that gets added, then this can replace things like AT_RANDOM.
There are non-crypto things out there that will want this. There are
also probably VM systems (especially ones that have something like my
KVM_GET_RNG_SEED patches applied, or many VMs on Haswell, for that
matter) that will have perfectly fine cryptographically secure urandom
output immediately after bootup but that won't consider themselves
"initialized" for a while. At least these will be perfectly fine from
the POV of those who trust their hypervisor and Intel :)
--Andy
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
