On 17 September 2014 13:29, Herbert Xu <herb...@gondor.apana.org.au> wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 10:01:07PM +0200, Romain Francoise wrote:
>> On Mon, Sep 15, 2014 at 10:36:46AM +0200, Romain Francoise wrote:
>> > I upgraded from v3.16 to v3.17-rc5 and the ctr-aes-aesni encryption test
>> > fails, which makes my IPsec tunnels unhappy (see trace below). Before I
>> > start bisecting (2cddcc7df8fd3 is probably my first guess), is this
>> > already known?
>>
>> > Sep 15 08:07:56 silenus kernel: [ 35.137145] alg: skcipher: Test 4
>> > failed on encryption for ctr-aes-aesni [...]
>>
>> Update: reverting 2cddcc7df8 ("crypto: aes - AES CTR x86_64 "by8" AVX
>> optimization") fixes this. This machine is Sandy Bridge (Core i7-2600),
>> and the problem doesn't seem to occur with the exact same kernel image
>> on Ivy Bridge (Xeon E3-1240v2).
>
> Thanks for bisecting. If we can't fix this quickly then we should
> just revert it for now.
>
[Adding James and Sean as they're stated as "contact information"]
I compared the implementation against the original code from Intel
referenced in the source file and found a few differences. But even
after removing those, the code still generates the same error. So if
Chandramouli does not come up with something, we should revert it, as
the reference implementation from Intel is a) either wrong or b) used
wrongly in the Linux kernel.
What might be worth noting, the failing test uses an IV value of
"\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFD",
or, in other words, a counter value that'll wrap after processing
three blocks. The Crypto++ implementation explicitly states, it can
handle the wrap around (see [1]). Dumping the IV before and after the
cryptomgr tests shows, the "by8" implementation only handles the lower
32 bit as a counter. Looking at RFC 3686, it defines the "counter
block" as a 128 bit combination of nonce, IV and a 32 bit counter
value. It also defines the initial value of the counter part (1) and
how it should be incremented (increment the whole counter block, i.e.
the 128 bit value). However, it also states that the maximum number
blocks per packet are (2^32)-1. So, according to the RFC, the wrap
around cannot happen -- not even for the 32 bit part of the counter
block. However the other aesni-backed implementation does handle the
wrap around just fine. It does so by doing the increment on a integer
register so it can use the carry flag to detect the wrap around.
Changing the "by8" variant would be straight forward, but I fear
performance implications... :/
Looking back at the test vector, even if it might be inappropriate for
IPsec, it is still valid for AES-CTR in the general case. So IMHO the
"by8" implementation is wrong and should be fixed -- or reverted, for
that matter.
James, Sean: Have you observed any interoperability problems with the
Intel reference implementation for the AVX by8 variant of AES-CTR?
Especially, have you tested the code for wrapping counter values?
Regards,
Mathias
[1] http://www.cryptopp.com/wiki/CTR_Mode
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-crypto" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
