> While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
> it is likely a tiny bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
> will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
> difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
> poses a real security risk.
To quantify that, jhash is 27 instructions per 12 bytes of input, with a
dependency path length of 13 instructions. (24/12 in __jash_mix, plus
3/1 for adding the input to the state.) The final add + __jhash_final
is 24 instructions with a path length of 15, which is close enough for
this handwaving. Call it 18n instructions and 8n cycles for 8n bytes.
SipHash (on a 64-bit machine) is 14 instructions with a dependency path
length of 4 *per round*. Two rounds per 8 bytes, plus plus two adds
and one cycle per input word, plus four rounds to finish makes 30n+46
instructions and 9n+16 cycles for 8n bytes.
So *if* you have a 64-bit 4-way superscalar machine, it's not that much
slower once it gets going, but the four-round finalization is quite
noticeable for short inputs.
For typical kernel input lengths "within a factor of 2" is
probably more accurate than "a tiny bit".
You lose a factor of 2 if you machine is 2-way or non-superscalar,
and a second factor of 2 if it's a 32-bit machine.
I mention this because there are a lot of home routers and other netwoek
appliances running Linux on 32-bit ARM and MIPS processors. For those,
it's a factor of *eight*, which is a lot more than "a tiny bit".
The real killer is if you don't have enough registers; SipHash performs
horribly on i386 because it uses more state than i386 has registers.
(If i386 performance is desired, you might ask Jean-Philippe for some
rotate constants for a 32-bit variant with 64 bits of key. Note that
SipHash's security proof requires that key length + input length is
strictly less than the state size, so for a 4x32-bit variant, while
you could stretch the key length a little, you'd have a hard limit at
95 bits.)
A second point, the final XOR in SipHash is either a (very minor) design
mistake, or an opportunity for optimization, depending on how you look
at it. Look at the end of the function:
>+ SIPROUND;
>+ SIPROUND;
>+ return (v0 ^ v1) ^ (v2 ^ v3);
Expanding that out, you get:
+ v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32);
+ v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2;
+ v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0;
+ v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32);
+ return v0 ^ v1 ^ v2 ^ v3;
Since the final XOR includes both v0 and v3, it's undoing the "v3 ^= v0"
two lines earlier, so the value of v0 doesn't matter after its XOR into
v1 on line one.
The final SIPROUND and return can then be optimized to
+ v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0;
+ v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2;
+ v3 = rol64(v3, 21);
+ v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32);
+ return v1 ^ v2 ^ v3;
A 32-bit implementation could further tweak the 4 instructions of
v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); v1 ^= v2;
gcc 6.2.1 -O3 compiles it to basically:
v1.low ^= v2.low;
v1.high ^= v2.high;
v1.low ^= v2.high;
v1.high ^= v2.low;
but it could be written as:
v2.low ^= v2.high;
v1.low ^= v2.low;
v1.high ^= v2.low;
Alternatively, if it's for private use only (key not shared with other
systems), a slightly stronger variant would "return v1 ^ v3;".
(The final swap of v2 is dead code, but a compiler can spot that easily.)
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