Hi Ard,
On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 11:29:22AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> -static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
> - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr,
> - u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * auth, u8 * s0)
> +static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr,
> + u8 * pn, size_t dlen, u8 * b0, u8 * aad)
> {
> u8 *pos, qc = 0;
> size_t aad_len;
> int a4_included, qc_included;
> - u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_LEN];
>
> a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
> qc_included = ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control);
> @@ -131,17 +123,19 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
> aad_len += 2;
> }
>
> - /* CCM Initial Block:
> - * Flag (Include authentication header, M=3 (8-octet MIC),
> - * L=1 (2-octet Dlen))
> - * Nonce: 0x00 | A2 | PN
> - * Dlen */
> - b0[0] = 0x59;
> + /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
> + * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
> + * from this vector b0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
> + * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
> + * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
> + * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
> + */
> + b0[0] = 0x1;
> +
> + /* Nonce: QC | A2 | PN */
> b0[1] = qc;
> memcpy(b0 + 2, hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
> memcpy(b0 + 8, pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
> - b0[14] = (dlen >> 8) & 0xff;
> - b0[15] = dlen & 0xff;
>
> /* AAD:
> * FC with bits 4..6 and 11..13 masked to zero; 14 is always one
> @@ -166,16 +160,6 @@ static void ccmp_init_blocks(struct crypto_cipher *tfm,
> aad[a4_included ? 30 : 24] = qc;
> /* rest of QC masked */
> }
> -
> - /* Start with the first block and AAD */
> - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, auth);
> - xor_block(auth, aad, AES_BLOCK_LEN);
> - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth);
> - xor_block(auth, &aad[AES_BLOCK_LEN], AES_BLOCK_LEN);
> - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, auth, auth);
> - b0[0] &= 0x07;
> - b0[14] = b0[15] = 0;
> - lib80211_ccmp_aes_encrypt(tfm, b0, s0);
> }
How about shifting the contents of aad over by 2 bytes and returning the AAD
length from this function instead? It's confusing to still manually format the
AAD length for CCM mode, when actually it's ignored now.
Also I suggest fixing up the naming:
ccmp_init_blocks() => ccmp_init_iv_and_aad()
b0 => iv
>
> static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len,
> @@ -218,13 +202,13 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_hdr(struct sk_buff *skb, int
> hdr_len,
> static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb, int hdr_len, void
> *priv)
> {
> struct lib80211_ccmp_data *key = priv;
> - int data_len, i, blocks, last, len;
> - u8 *pos, *mic;
> struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
> - u8 *b0 = key->tx_b0;
> - u8 *b = key->tx_b;
> - u8 *e = key->tx_e;
> - u8 *s0 = key->tx_s0;
> + struct aead_request *req;
> + struct scatterlist sg[2];
> + u8 *aad = key->tx_aad;
> + u8 b0[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
> + int len, data_len;
> + int ret;
>
> if (skb_tailroom(skb) < CCMP_MIC_LEN || skb->len < hdr_len)
> return -1;
> @@ -234,31 +218,29 @@ static int lib80211_ccmp_encrypt(struct sk_buff *skb,
> int hdr_len, void *priv)
> if (len < 0)
> return -1;
>
> - pos = skb->data + hdr_len + CCMP_HDR_LEN;
> + req = kzalloc(sizeof(*req) + crypto_aead_reqsize(key->tfm), GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (!req)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> +
Why not kzalloc() and kzfree() instead of aead_request_alloc() and
aead_request_free()? Same in lib80211_ccmp_decrypt().
Otherwise this patch looks good, though I'd like for someone to test it.
Thanks for doing this!
- Eric
