On Thu, Oct 10, 2019 at 03:12:02PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > I'm going to do the selftests next so the above can't happen again.
>
> The test vectors should be included in this patch.
>
> > +
> > + - blake2b - the default 512b digest
> > + - blake2b-160
> > + - blake2b-256
> > + - blake2b-384
> > + - blake2b-512
> > +
>
> Why have the "blake2b" algorithm at all, when it's already available under the
> name "blake2b-512"? It's confusing to have two different names for the same
> algorithm because then people will need to decide which one to use, and both
> will need to be tested.
The idea is that 'blake2b' is a convenience alias for the default digest
size, as it is commonly referred. But I agree it's can cause some
confusion, so I'll remove it.
> > +struct blake2b_param
> > +{
> > + u8 digest_length; /* 1 */
> > + u8 key_length; /* 2 */
> > + u8 fanout; /* 3 */
> > + u8 depth; /* 4 */
> > + u32 leaf_length; /* 8 */
> > + u32 node_offset; /* 12 */
> > + u32 xof_length; /* 16 */
>
> The u32 fields need to be __le32, since this struct is interpreted as an array
> of bytes.
For this and several other comments: I tried to minimize changes to the
the reference implementation, not to introduce bugs or remove code that
should be there, unless requested by a reviewer. I hope you understand
that and don't mind.
> > +static int blake2b_init(struct blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen)
> > +{
> > + struct blake2b_param P[1];
>
> This shouldn't be an array.
Copied from the original, will switch to simple variable.
> > + if ((!outlen) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES))
> > + return -1;
>
> No need for these checks, since this patch doesn't provide any way for the
> user
> to set an arbitrary outlen. They should either be removed, or replaced with a
> WARN_ON(). As-is, it looks like a valid error, which is bad because some
> callers of the crypto_shash API don't handle errors.
I see and will remove it.
> > + P->digest_length = (u8)outlen;
> > + P->key_length = 0;
> > + P->fanout = 1;
> > + P->depth = 1;
> > + put_unaligned_le32(0, &P->leaf_length);
> > + put_unaligned_le32(0, &P->node_offset);
> > + put_unaligned_le32(0, &P->xof_length);
>
> struct blake2b_param is already a packed structure, so these should be direct
> assignments. No need for put_unaligned_le32().
>
> > + P->node_depth = 0;
> > + P->inner_length = 0;
> > + memset(P->reserved, 0, sizeof(P->reserved));
> > + memset(P->salt, 0, sizeof(P->salt));
> > + memset(P->personal, 0, sizeof(P->personal));
> > + return blake2b_init_param(S, P);
> > +}
> > +
> > +static int blake2b_init_key(struct blake2b_state *S, size_t outlen,
> > + const void *key, size_t keylen)
> > +{
> > + struct blake2b_param P[1];
> > +
> > + if ((!outlen) || (outlen > BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES))
> > + return -1;
> > +
> > + if (!key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES)
> > + return -1;
>
> More unclear error checks here. Which are actually valid reachable errors,
> and
> which are assertions that should never trigger? See comment above.
>
> > +
> > + P->digest_length = (u8)outlen;
> > + P->key_length = (u8)keylen;
> > + P->fanout = 1;
> > + P->depth = 1;
> > + put_unaligned_le32(0, &P->leaf_length);
> > + put_unaligned_le32(0, &P->node_offset);
> > + put_unaligned_le32(0, &P->xof_length);
>
> Same problem with the unnecessary put_unaligned_le32().
>
> > +static int blake2b_final(struct blake2b_state *S, void *out, size_t outlen)
> > +{
> > + u8 buffer[BLAKE2B_OUTBYTES] = {0};
> > + size_t i;
> > +
> > + if (out == NULL || outlen < S->outlen)
> > + return -1;
>
> More unnecessary error checks. None of the other hash algorithms check for a
> NULL output buffer, and some users don't check for errors. So returning -1
> instead of just crashing could hide bugs.
Yeah, removing the checks will allow to remove return values.
> > + if (blake2b_is_lastblock(S))
> > + return -1;
>
> This can't be the case because lastblock is only set by final().
>
> > +static int digest_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
> > + unsigned int keylen)
> > +{
> > + struct digest_tfm_ctx *mctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
> > +
> > + if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES) {
> > + crypto_shash_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + }
> > +
> > + memcpy(mctx->key, key, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES);
> > + mctx->keylen = keylen;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> This reads past the end of the key buffer if keylen < BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES.
>
> Please add tests and run with CONFIG_KASAN=y.
Right, I'll fix it. The selftests did not catch this because all of them
used the maximum key length.
> > +static int digest_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> > + unsigned int length)
> > +{
> > + struct digest_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + ret = blake2b_update(ctx->S, data, length);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> Why does update() need to fail? Not all shash API users check for errors.
>
> > +
> > +static int digest_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
> > +{
> > + struct digest_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> > + const int digestsize = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + ret = blake2b_final(ctx->S, out, digestsize);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> Likewise. Why does final() need to fail?
>
> > +
> > +static int digest_finup(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
> > + unsigned int len, u8 *out)
> > +{
> > + struct digest_desc_ctx *ctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
> > + const int digestsize = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
> > + int ret;
> > +
> > + ret = blake2b_update(ctx->S, data, len);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + ret = blake2b_final(ctx->S, out, digestsize);
> > + if (ret)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> finup() shouldn't be implemented if it can't be made more efficient than
> update() and final() separately.
Ok, will be removed.
> > +static int blake2b_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
> > +{
> > + struct digest_tfm_ctx *mctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
> > +
> > + /* Use the unkeyed version by default */
> > + memset(mctx->key, 0, BLAKE2B_KEYBYTES);
> > + mctx->keylen = 0;
> > +
> > + return 0;
> > +}
>
> No need for this function, since the tfm_ctx starts out zeroed by default.
Ok, will be removed.
> > +static struct shash_alg blake2b_algs[] = {
> > + {
> > + .digestsize = BLAKE2B_512_DIGEST_SIZE,
> > + .setkey = digest_setkey,
> > + .init = digest_init,
> > + .update = digest_update,
> > + .final = digest_final,
> > + .finup = digest_finup,
> > + .descsize = sizeof(struct digest_desc_ctx),
> > + .base.cra_name = "blake2b",
> > + .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2b-generic",
> > + .base.cra_priority = 100,
> > + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
> > + .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES,
> > + .base.cra_ctxsize = 0,
>
> Need to set cra_ctxsize to sizeof(struct digest_tfm_ctx), otherwise the code
> is
> using an area beyond the end of the buffer for the tfm_ctx. This would have
> been caught if there were self tests and they were run with CONFIG_KASAN=y.
I found it out the hard way, the sefltests caused memory overwrite,
caught by SLUB_DEBUG, but I did the KASAN pass as well, no further
problems found.
I'll spin v4, adding the test vectors. It'll be probably a series
because single patch I have now is over 400K in size, so we'd need one
more feedback round to decide what test values to include.
Thanks for the comments.
