On 06/08/2016 06:18 AM, Matt Fleming wrote:
> On Tue, 26 Apr, at 05:57:40PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> The EFI tables are not encrypted and need to be accessed as such. Be sure
>> to memmap them without the encryption attribute set. For EFI support that
>> lives outside of the arch/x86 tree, create a routine that uses the __weak
>> attribute so that it can be overridden by an architecture specific routine.
>>
>> When freeing boot services related memory, since it has been mapped as
>> un-encrypted, be sure to change the mapping to encrypted for future use.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lenda...@amd.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 3 +
>> arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 22 +++++++++++
>> arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 6 +--
>> arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 75
>> ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 26 +++++++-----
>> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 9 +++-
>> arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 12 +++++-
>> drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 18 +++++++--
>> drivers/firmware/efi/esrt.c | 12 +++---
>> include/linux/efi.h | 3 +
>> 11 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
>
> [...]
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> index 994a7df8..871b213 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
>> @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
>> #include <asm/x86_init.h>
>> #include <asm/rtc.h>
>> #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
>> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>>
>> #define EFI_DEBUG
>>
>> @@ -261,12 +262,12 @@ static int __init efi_systab_init(void *phys)
>> u64 tmp = 0;
>>
>> if (efi_setup) {
>> - data = early_memremap(efi_setup, sizeof(*data));
>> + data = sme_early_memremap(efi_setup, sizeof(*data));
>> if (!data)
>> return -ENOMEM;
>> }
>
> Beware, this data comes from a previous kernel that kexec'd this
> kernel. Unless you've updated bzImage64_load() to allocate an
> unencrypted region 'efi_setup' will in fact be encrypted.
Yes, I missed the kexec path originally and need to take that into
account in general.
>
>> @@ -690,6 +691,7 @@ static void *realloc_pages(void *old_memmap, int
>> old_shift)
>> ret = (void *)__get_free_pages(GFP_KERNEL, old_shift + 1);
>> if (!ret)
>> goto out;
>> + sme_set_mem_dec(ret, PAGE_SIZE << (old_shift + 1));
>>
>> /*
>> * A first-time allocation doesn't have anything to copy.
>
> I'm not sure why it's necessary to mark this region as unencrypted,
> because at this point the kernel controls the platform and when we
> call into the firmware it should be using our page tables. I wouldn't
> expect the firmware to mess with the SYSCFG MSR either.
>
> Have you come across a situation where the above was required?
I was trying to play it safe here, but as you say, the firmware should
be using our page tables so we can get rid of this call. The problem
will actually be if we transition to a 32-bit efi. The encryption bit
will be lost in cr3 and so the pgd table will have to be un-encrypted.
The entries in the pgd can have the encryption bit set so I would only
need to worry about the pgd itself. I'll have to update the
efi_alloc_page_tables routine.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
>> index 49e4dd4..834a992 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
>> @@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long
>> pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
>> if (efi_enabled(EFI_OLD_MEMMAP))
>> return 0;
>>
>> - efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__pa(efi_pgd);
>> + efi_scratch.efi_pgt = (pgd_t *)__sme_pa(efi_pgd);
>> pgd = efi_pgd;
>>
>> /*
>
> Huh? Why does __pa() now OR in sme_mas_mask? I thought SME only
> required the page table structures to be modified, not the end
> address?
The encryption bit in the cr3 register will indicate if the pgd table
is encrypted or not. Based on my comment above about the pgd having
to be un-encrypted in case we have to transition to 32-bit efi, this
can be removed.
>
>> @@ -262,7 +262,8 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long
>> pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
>> pfn = md->phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> npages = md->num_pages;
>>
>> - if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, npages,
>> _PAGE_RW)) {
>> + if (kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd, pfn, md->phys_addr, npages,
>> + _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_ENC)) {
>> pr_err("Failed to map 1:1 memory\n");
>> return 1;
>> }
>
> Could you push the _PAGE_ENC addition down into
> kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()? Other flags are also handled that way, see
> _PAGE_PRESENT.
I'll look into this a bit more. From looking at it I don't want the
_PAGE_ENC bit set for the memmap unless it gets re-allocated (which
I missed in these patches). Let me see what I can do with this.
>
>> @@ -272,6 +273,7 @@ int __init efi_setup_page_tables(unsigned long
>> pa_memmap, unsigned num_pages)
>> if (!page)
>> panic("Unable to allocate EFI runtime stack < 4GB\n");
>>
>> + sme_set_mem_dec(page_address(page), PAGE_SIZE);
>> efi_scratch.phys_stack = virt_to_phys(page_address(page));
>> efi_scratch.phys_stack += PAGE_SIZE; /* stack grows down */
>>
>
> We should not need to mark the stack as unencrypted, the firmware
> should respect our SME settings, right?
Yup, you're correct. I think we can get rid of this call, too.
>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
>> index ab50ada..dde4fb6b 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c
>> @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
>> #include <linux/dmi.h>
>> #include <asm/efi.h>
>> #include <asm/uv/uv.h>
>> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>>
>> #define EFI_MIN_RESERVE 5120
>>
>> @@ -265,6 +266,13 @@ void __init efi_free_boot_services(void)
>> if (md->attribute & EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME)
>> continue;
>>
>> + /*
>> + * Change the mapping to encrypted memory before freeing.
>> + * This insures any future allocations of this mapped area
>> + * are used encrypted.
>> + */
>> + sme_set_mem_enc(__va(start), size);
>> +
>> free_bootmem_late(start, size);
>> }
>>
>
> I don't think it's necessary to have to mark the __va() mapping of
> these regions as encrypted at this point. They should be setup that
> way initially.
>
> The reason is that it'd be a bug if these regions were accessed via
> the __va() mappings before this point. Unless there's something I'm
> missing.
I'll look further into this, but I saw that this area of virtual memory
was mapped un-encrypted and after freeing the boot services the
mappings were somehow reused as un-encrypted for DMA which assumes
(unless using swiotlb) encrypted. This resulted in DMA data being
transferred in as encrypted and then accessed un-encrypted.
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
>> index 3a69ed5..25010c7 100644
>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
>> @@ -76,6 +76,16 @@ static int __init parse_efi_cmdline(char *str)
>> }
>> early_param("efi", parse_efi_cmdline);
>>
>> +/*
>> + * If memory encryption is supported, then an override to this function
>> + * will be provided.
>> + */
>> +void __weak __init *efi_me_early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr,
>> + unsigned long size)
>> +{
>> + return early_memremap(phys_addr, size);
>> +}
>> +
>> struct kobject *efi_kobj;
>>
>> /*
>
> Like I said in my other mail, I'd much prefer to see this buried in
> arch/x86 by passing a flag to early_memremap() which can be parsed in
> arch directories.
>
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in
the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
