From: William Roberts <william.c.robe...@intel.com>
Some out-of-tree modules do not use %pK and just use %p, as it's
the common C paradigm for printing pointers. Because of this,
kptr_restrict has no affect on the output and thus, no way to
contain the kernel address leak.
Introduce kptr_restrict level 3 that causes the kernel to
treat %p as if it was %pK and thus always prints zeros.
Sample Output:
kptr_restrict == 2:
p: 00000000604369f4
pK: 0000000000000000
kptr_restrict == 3:
p: 0000000000000000
pK: 0000000000000000
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.robe...@intel.com>
---
Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 3 ++
kernel/sysctl.c | 3 +-
lib/vsprintf.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
index ffab8b5..bca72a0 100644
--- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
+++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
@@ -393,6 +393,9 @@ values to unprivileged users is a concern.
When kptr_restrict is set to (2), kernel pointers printed using
%pK will be replaced with 0's regardless of privileges.
+When kptr_restrict is set to (3), kernel pointers printed using
+%p and %pK will be replaced with 0's regardless of privileges.
+
==============================================================
kstack_depth_to_print: (X86 only)
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index a377bfa..0d4e4af 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
static int one_hundred = 100;
static int one_thousand = 1000;
#ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
+static int three = 3;
static int ten_thousand = 10000;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
@@ -847,7 +848,7 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
.extra1 = &zero,
- .extra2 = &two,
+ .extra2 = &three,
},
#endif
{
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 0967771..371cfab 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1472,6 +1472,56 @@ char *flags_string(char *buf, char *end, void
*flags_ptr, const char *fmt)
int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
+static inline void *cleanse_pointer(void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec,
+ char *buf, char *end, int default_width)
+{
+ switch (kptr_restrict) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Always print %p values */
+ break;
+ case 1: {
+ const struct cred *cred;
+
+ /*
+ * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
+ * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
+ */
+ if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
+ if (spec.field_width == -1)
+ spec.field_width = default_width;
+ return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Only print the real pointer value if the current
+ * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
+ * same credentials it started with. This is because
+ * access to files is checked at open() time, but %p
+ * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
+ * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
+ * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
+ */
+ cred = current_cred();
+ if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
+ !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ case 2: /* restrict only %pK */
+ case 3: /* restrict all non-extensioned %p and %pK */
+ default:
+ ptr = NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+static inline int kptr_restrict_always_cleanse(void)
+{
+ return kptr_restrict == 3;
+}
+
/*
* Show a '%p' thing. A kernel extension is that the '%p' is followed
* by an extra set of alphanumeric characters that are extended format
@@ -1569,6 +1619,9 @@ int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
* Note: The difference between 'S' and 'F' is that on ia64 and ppc64
* function pointers are really function descriptors, which contain a
* pointer to the real address.
+ *
+ * Note: That for kptr_restrict set to 3, %p and %pK have the same
+ * meaning.
*/
static noinline_for_stack
char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void *ptr,
@@ -1576,7 +1629,7 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end, void
*ptr,
{
const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(void *);
- if (!ptr && *fmt != 'K') {
+ if (!ptr && *fmt != 'K' && !kptr_restrict_always_cleanse()) {
/*
* Print (null) with the same width as a pointer so it makes
* tabular output look nice.
@@ -1657,48 +1710,6 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end,
void *ptr,
va_end(va);
return buf;
}
- case 'K':
- switch (kptr_restrict) {
- case 0:
- /* Always print %pK values */
- break;
- case 1: {
- const struct cred *cred;
-
- /*
- * kptr_restrict==1 cannot be used in IRQ context
- * because its test for CAP_SYSLOG would be meaningless.
- */
- if (in_irq() || in_serving_softirq() || in_nmi()) {
- if (spec.field_width == -1)
- spec.field_width = default_width;
- return string(buf, end, "pK-error", spec);
- }
-
- /*
- * Only print the real pointer value if the current
- * process has CAP_SYSLOG and is running with the
- * same credentials it started with. This is because
- * access to files is checked at open() time, but %pK
- * checks permission at read() time. We don't want to
- * leak pointer values if a binary opens a file using
- * %pK and then elevates privileges before reading it.
- */
- cred = current_cred();
- if (!has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG) ||
- !uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
- !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid))
- ptr = NULL;
- break;
- }
- case 2:
- default:
- /* Always print 0's for %pK */
- ptr = NULL;
- break;
- }
- break;
-
case 'N':
return netdev_bits(buf, end, ptr, fmt);
case 'a':
@@ -1718,6 +1729,16 @@ char *pointer(const char *fmt, char *buf, char *end,
void *ptr,
case 'G':
return flags_string(buf, end, ptr, fmt);
+ default:
+ /*
+ * plain %p, no extension, check if we should always cleanse and
+ * treat like %pK.
+ */
+ if (!kptr_restrict_always_cleanse())
+ break;
+ case 'K':
+ /* always check whether or not to cleanse kernel addresses */
+ ptr = cleanse_pointer(ptr, spec, buf, end, default_width);
}
spec.flags |= SMALL;
if (spec.field_width == -1) {
--
1.9.1
--
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