Hi Laura,

On 19/01/17 01:29, Laura Abbott wrote:
> 
> Despite the word 'debug' in CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, this kernel
> option provides key security features that are to be expected on a
> modern system. Change the name to CONFIG_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS which
> more accurately describes what this option is intended to do.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labb...@redhat.com>
> ---

[...]

> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> index 09aff28..ef852e4 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ config ARM
>       select ARCH_HAVE_CUSTOM_GPIO_H
>       select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>       select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS if MMU && !XIP_KERNEL
> +     select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS if MMU
>       select ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT
>       select ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW
>       select ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP
> diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
> index d83f7c3..426d271 100644
> --- a/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -1738,17 +1738,6 @@ config PID_IN_CONTEXTIDR
>         additional instructions during context switch. Say Y here only if you
>         are planning to use hardware trace tools with this kernel.
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -     bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
> -     depends on MODULES && MMU
> -     ---help---
> -       This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
> -       kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
> -       of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
> -       patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
> -       against certain classes of kernel exploits.
> -       If in doubt, say "N".
> -
>  source "drivers/hwtracing/coresight/Kconfig"
>  
>  endmenu

[...]

> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
> @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ config ARM64
>       select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>       select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>       select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +     select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>       select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>       select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>       select ARCH_HAS_TICK_BROADCAST if GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> index a26d27f..1eebe1f 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -71,17 +71,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
>  
>         If in doubt, say "Y".
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -     bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
> -     depends on MODULES
> -     default y
> -     help
> -       Is this is set, kernel module text and rodata will be made read-only.
> -       This is to help catch accidental or malicious attempts to change the
> -       kernel's executable code.
> -
> -       If in doubt, say Y.
> -
>  config DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
>       depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
>       bool "Align linker sections up to SECTION_SIZE"

[...]

> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig
> @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ config S390
>       select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>       select ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE
>       select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +     select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>       select ARCH_HAS_KCOV
>       select ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN
>       select ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL
> diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
> index 26c5d5be..57f8ea9 100644
> --- a/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -17,7 +17,4 @@ config S390_PTDUMP
>         kernel.
>         If in doubt, say "N"
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -     def_bool y
> -     depends on MODULES
>  endmenu
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index 9d80cd8..38ce850 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ config X86
>       select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER
>       select ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL
>       select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MAPPINGS
> +     select ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
>       select ARCH_HAS_KCOV                    if X86_64
>       select ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH
>       select ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API                if X86_64
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> index 67eec55..69cdd0b 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
> @@ -109,17 +109,6 @@ config DEBUG_WX
>  
>         If in doubt, say "Y".
>  
> -config DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
> -     bool "Set loadable kernel module data as NX and text as RO"
> -     depends on MODULES
> -     ---help---
> -       This option helps catch unintended modifications to loadable
> -       kernel module's text and read-only data. It also prevents execution
> -       of module data. Such protection may interfere with run-time code
> -       patching and dynamic kernel tracing - and they might also protect
> -       against certain classes of kernel exploits.
> -       If in doubt, say "N".
> -
>  config DEBUG_NX_TEST
>       tristate "Testcase for the NX non-executable stack feature"
>       depends on DEBUG_KERNEL && m

[...]

> --- a/security/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/Kconfig
> @@ -174,6 +174,22 @@ config HARDENED_PAGE_MAPPINGS
>         Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
>         is recommended to say Y here.
>  
> +config ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> +     def_bool n
> +
> +config HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS
> +     bool "Mark module mappings with stricter permissions (RO/W^X)"
> +     default y
> +     depends on ARCH_HAS_HARDENED_MODULE_MAPPINGS

It would seem that this ends up losing the previous dependency on
MODULES - is that intentional?

Robin.

> +     help
> +       If this is set, module text and rodata memory will be made read-only,
> +       and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides
> +       protection against certain security vulnerabilities (e.g. modifying
> +       code)
> +
> +       Unless your system has known restrictions or performance issues, it
> +       is recommended to say Y here.
> +
>  source security/selinux/Kconfig
>  source security/smack/Kconfig
>  source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
> 

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