On Tue, Aug 22, 2017 at 11:35:20PM +0800, Anand Jain wrote: > >> > >> I think AE is the only good solution for this, File-name encryption at > >>this stage won't solve any kind of Evil Maid attack, (as it was quoted > >>somewhere else in ML). > >> > >> > >> Further, below, is define but not used. > >>----- > >> #define FS_AES_256_GCM_KEY_SIZE 32 > >>----- > >> > > > >Yes, authenticated encryption with AES-256-GCM was in an older version of the > >ext4 encryption design document. But unfortunately it was never really > >thought > >through. The primary problem, even ignoring rollback protection, is that > >there > >is nowhere to store the per-block metadata (GCM authentication tag and IV) > >*and* > >have it updated atomicly with the block contents. Recently, dm-integrity > >solves > >this at the block device layer, but it uses data journaling which is very > >inefficient. This maybe could be implemented more efficiently on a COW > >filesystem like BTRFS. But even after that, another problem is that > >authenticated encryption of file contents only would not stop an attacker > >from > >swapping around blocks, files, directories, or creating links, etc. > > > Some of the problems to be solved in this area are quite > interesting and challenging and IMO BTRFS fits nicely. Per extent AE > for BTRFS is drafted, it needs scrutiny and constructive feedback. > > Thanks, Anand > > > >Eric > >
Where is the code? Is there a design document, and it is it readable by people not as familiar with btrfs? Is the API compatible with ext4, f2fs, and ubifs? Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majord...@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
