On Thu, 8 Jan 2026 at 11:54, Mark Brown <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Wed, Jan 07, 2026 at 07:25:04PM +0000, Fuad Tabba wrote: > > On Tue, 23 Dec 2025 at 01:21, Mark Brown <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > +#define sme_cond_update_smcr(vl, fa64, zt0, reg) \ > > > + do { \ > > > + u64 __old = read_sysreg_s((reg)); \ > > > + u64 __new = vl; \ > > > + if (fa64) \ > > > + __new |= SMCR_ELx_FA64; \ > > > + if (zt0) \ > > > + __new |= SMCR_ELx_EZT0; \ > > > + if (__old != __new) \ > > > + write_sysreg_s(__new, (reg)); \ > > > + } while (0) > > > + > > > Should we cap the VL based on SMCR_ELx_LEN_MASK (as we do in > > sve_cond_update_zcr_vq())? > > Yes, although I fear if we've got to the point where we've ever got a > bigger value going in we're going to have bigger problems.
Yeah, but I think that we should be consistent with the SVE case, at the very least, not to confuse the next person (e.g., future me) who might look at the two and wonder why they are different. > > Should we also preserve the remaining old bits from SMCR_EL1, i.e., > > copy over the bits that aren't > > SMCR_ELx_LEN_MASK|SMCR_ELx_FA64|SMCR_ELx_EZT0? For now they are RES0, > > but that could change. > > My thinking here is that any new bits are almost certainly going to need > explicit support (like with the addition of ZT0) and that copying them > forward without understanding is more likely to lead to a bug like > exposing state we didn't mean to than clearing them will. I understand the 'secure by default' intent for enable bits, but I'm concerned that this implementation changes the current behavior of the host kernel, which isn't mentioned in the commit message. Previously, both the feature enablement code (cpu_enable_fa64) and the vector length setting code (sme_set_vq/write_vl) performed a RMW, preserving existing bits in SMCR_EL1. This new macro zeroes out any bits not explicitly tracked here. In terms of copying them over, if they were set from the beginning, doesn't that mean that that explicit support was already added? Cheers, /fuad
