On Sun, Nov 25, 2018 at 08:45:00PM +0530, Nayna Jain wrote:
> On secure boot enabled systems, the bootloader verifies the kernel
> image and possibly the initramfs signatures based on a set of keys. A
> soft reboot(kexec) of the system, with the same kernel image and
> initramfs, requires access to the original keys to verify the
> signatures.
>
> This patch allows IMA-appraisal access to those original keys, now
> loaded on the platform keyring, needed for verifying the kernel image
> and initramfs signatures.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <na...@linux.ibm.com>
> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zo...@linux.ibm.com>
The overall set seems sensible to me, and I see no errors here,
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <se...@hallyn.com>
I do think that replacing the 'rc' with xattr_len in the previous line might
help future readers save a few cycles.
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> index deec1804a00a..9c13585e7d3e 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
> @@ -294,7 +294,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func,
> iint->ima_hash->length);
> if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
> status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
> - } else if (rc) {
> + break;
> + }
> + if (rc && func == KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK)
> + rc = integrity_digsig_verify(
> + INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM,
> + (const char *)xattr_value,
> + xattr_len,
> + iint->ima_hash->digest,
> + iint->ima_hash->length);
> + if (rc) {
> cause = "invalid-signature";
> status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
> } else {
> --
> 2.13.6
>
