> On Aug 24, 2018, at 12:16 PM, Eric Biggers <ebigg...@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> From: Eric Biggers <ebigg...@google.com>
>
> Add functions that verify data pages that have been read from a
> fs-verity file, against that file's Merkle tree. These will be called
> from filesystems' ->readpage() and ->readpages() methods.
>
> Since data verification can block, a workqueue is provided for these
> methods to enqueue verification work from their bio completion callback.
>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebigg...@google.com>
> ---
> fs/verity/Makefile | 2 +-
> fs/verity/fsverity_private.h | 3 +
> fs/verity/setup.c | 26 ++-
> fs/verity/verify.c | 310 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/fsverity.h | 23 +++
> 5 files changed, 362 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 fs/verity/verify.c
>
> diff --git a/fs/verity/Makefile b/fs/verity/Makefile
> index 39e123805c827..a6c7cefb61ab7 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/Makefile
> +++ b/fs/verity/Makefile
> @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
> obj-$(CONFIG_FS_VERITY) += fsverity.o
>
> -fsverity-y := hash_algs.o setup.o
> +fsverity-y := hash_algs.o setup.o verify.o
> diff --git a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> index a18ff645695f4..c553f99dc4973 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> +++ b/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
> @@ -96,4 +96,7 @@ static inline bool set_fsverity_info(struct inode *inode,
> return true;
> }
>
> +/* verify.c */
> +extern struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue;
> +
> #endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */
> diff --git a/fs/verity/setup.c b/fs/verity/setup.c
> index e675c52898d5b..84cc2edeca25b 100644
> --- a/fs/verity/setup.c
> +++ b/fs/verity/setup.c
> @@ -824,18 +824,42 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_full_i_size);
>
> static int __init fsverity_module_init(void)
> {
> + int err;
> +
> + /*
> + * Use an unbound workqueue to allow bios to be verified in parallel
> + * even when they happen to complete on the same CPU. This sacrifices
> + * locality, but it's worthwhile since hashing is CPU-intensive.
> + *
> + * Also use a high-priority workqueue to prioritize verification work,
> + * which blocks reads from completing, over regular application tasks.
> + */
> + err = -ENOMEM;
> + fsverity_read_workqueue = alloc_workqueue("fsverity_read_queue",
> + WQ_UNBOUND | WQ_HIGHPRI,
> + num_online_cpus());
> + if (!fsverity_read_workqueue)
> + goto error;
> +
> + err = -ENOMEM;
> fsverity_info_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(fsverity_info, SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT);
> if (!fsverity_info_cachep)
> - return -ENOMEM;
> + goto error_free_workqueue;
>
> fsverity_check_hash_algs();
>
> pr_debug("Initialized fs-verity\n");
> return 0;
> +
> +error_free_workqueue:
> + destroy_workqueue(fsverity_read_workqueue);
> +error:
> + return err;
> }
>
> static void __exit fsverity_module_exit(void)
> {
> + destroy_workqueue(fsverity_read_workqueue);
> kmem_cache_destroy(fsverity_info_cachep);
> fsverity_exit_hash_algs();
> }
> diff --git a/fs/verity/verify.c b/fs/verity/verify.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000000..1452dd05f75d3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/fs/verity/verify.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
> +/*
> + * fs/verity/verify.c: fs-verity data verification functions,
> + * i.e. hooks for ->readpages()
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2018 Google LLC
> + *
> + * Originally written by Jaegeuk Kim and Michael Halcrow;
> + * heavily rewritten by Eric Biggers.
> + */
> +
> +#include "fsverity_private.h"
> +
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
> +#include <linux/bio.h>
> +#include <linux/pagemap.h>
> +#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
> +#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
> +
> +struct workqueue_struct *fsverity_read_workqueue;
> +
> +/**
> + * hash_at_level() - compute the location of the block's hash at the given
> level
> + *
> + * @vi: (in) the file's verity info
> + * @dindex: (in) the index of the data block being verified
> + * @level: (in) the level of hash we want
> + * @hindex: (out) the index of the hash block containing the wanted hash
> + * @hoffset: (out) the byte offset to the wanted hash within the hash block
> + */
> +static void hash_at_level(const struct fsverity_info *vi, pgoff_t dindex,
> + unsigned int level, pgoff_t *hindex,
> + unsigned int *hoffset)
> +{
> + pgoff_t hoffset_in_lvl;
> +
> + /*
> + * Compute the offset of the hash within the level's region, in hashes.
> + * For example, with 4096-byte blocks and 32-byte hashes, there are
> + * 4096/32 = 128 = 2^7 hashes per hash block, i.e. log_arity = 7. Then,
> + * if the data block index is 65668 and we want the level 1 hash, it is
> + * located at 65668 >> 7 = 513 hashes into the level 1 region.
> + */
> + hoffset_in_lvl = dindex >> (level * vi->log_arity);
> +
> + /*
> + * Compute the index of the hash block containing the wanted hash.
> + * Continuing the above example, the block would be at index 513 >> 7 =
> + * 4 within the level 1 region. To this we'd add the index at which the
> + * level 1 region starts.
> + */
> + *hindex = vi->hash_lvl_region_idx[level] +
> + (hoffset_in_lvl >> vi->log_arity);
> +
> + /*
> + * Finally, compute the index of the hash within the block rather than
> + * the region, and multiply by the hash size to turn it into a byte
> + * offset. Continuing the above example, the hash would be at byte
> + * offset (513 & ((1 << 7) - 1)) * 32 = 32 within the block.
> + */
> + *hoffset = (hoffset_in_lvl & ((1 << vi->log_arity) - 1)) *
> + vi->hash_alg->digest_size;
> +}
> +
> +/* Extract a hash from a hash page */
> +static void extract_hash(struct page *hpage, unsigned int hoffset,
> + unsigned int hsize, u8 *out)
> +{
> + void *virt = kmap_atomic(hpage);
> +
> + memcpy(out, virt + hoffset, hsize);
> + kunmap_atomic(virt);
> +}
> +
> +static int hash_page(const struct fsverity_info *vi, struct ahash_request
> *req,
> + struct page *page, u8 *out)
> +{
> + struct scatterlist sg[3];
> + DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait);
> + int err;
> +
> + sg_init_table(sg, 1);
> + sg_set_page(&sg[0], page, PAGE_SIZE, 0);
> +
> + ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP |
> + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
> + crypto_req_done, &wait);
> + ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, out, PAGE_SIZE);
> +
> + err = crypto_ahash_import(req, vi->hashstate);
> + if (err)
> + return err;
> +
> + return crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_finup(req), &wait);
> +}
> +
> +static inline int compare_hashes(const u8 *want_hash, const u8 *real_hash,
> + int digest_size, struct inode *inode,
> + pgoff_t index, int level, const char *algname)
> +{
> + if (memcmp(want_hash, real_hash, digest_size) == 0)
> + return 0;
> +
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("VERIFICATION FAILURE! ino=%lu, index=%lu,
> level=%d, want_hash=%s:%*phN, real_hash=%s:%*phN\n",
> + inode->i_ino, index, level,
> + algname, digest_size, want_hash,
> + algname, digest_size, real_hash);
> + return -EBADMSG;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Verify a single data page against the file's Merkle tree.
> + *
> + * In principle, we need to verify the entire path to the root node. But as
> an
> + * optimization, we cache the hash pages in the file's page cache, similar to
> + * data pages. Therefore, we can stop verifying as soon as a verified hash
> page
> + * is seen while ascending the tree.
> + *
> + * Note that unlike data pages, hash pages are marked Uptodate *before* they
> are
> + * verified; instead, the Checked bit is set on hash pages that have been
> + * verified. Multiple tasks may race to verify a hash page and mark it
> Checked,
> + * but it doesn't matter. The use of the Checked bit also implies that the
> hash
> + * block size must equal PAGE_SIZE (for now).
> + */
> +static bool verify_page(struct inode *inode, const struct fsverity_info *vi,
> + struct ahash_request *req, struct page *data_page)
> +{
> + pgoff_t index = data_page->index;
> + int level = 0;
> + u8 _want_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + const u8 *want_hash = NULL;
> + u8 real_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
> + struct page *hpages[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
> + unsigned int hoffsets[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
> + int err;
> +
> + /* The page must not be unlocked until verification has completed. */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!PageLocked(data_page)))
> + return false;
> +
> + /*
> + * Since ->i_size is overridden with ->data_i_size, and fs-verity avoids
> + * recursing into itself when reading hash pages, we shouldn't normally
> + * get here with a page beyond ->data_i_size. But, it can happen if a
> + * read is issued at or beyond EOF since the VFS doesn't check i_size
> + * before calling ->readpage(). Thus, just skip verification if the
> + * page is beyond ->data_i_size.
> + */
> + if (index >= (vi->data_i_size + PAGE_SIZE - 1) >> PAGE_SHIFT) {
> + pr_debug("Page %lu is in metadata region\n", index);
> + return true;
> + }
> +
> + pr_debug_ratelimited("Verifying data page %lu...\n", index);
> +
> + /*
> + * Starting at the leaves, ascend the tree saving hash pages along the
> + * way until we find a verified hash page, indicated by PageChecked; or
> + * until we reach the root.
> + */
> + for (level = 0; level < vi->depth; level++) {
> + pgoff_t hindex;
> + unsigned int hoffset;
> + struct page *hpage;
> +
> + hash_at_level(vi, index, level, &hindex, &hoffset);
> +
> + pr_debug_ratelimited("Level %d: hindex=%lu, hoffset=%u\n",
> + level, hindex, hoffset);
> +
> + hpage = read_mapping_page(inode->i_mapping, hindex, NULL);
> + if (IS_ERR(hpage)) {
> + err = PTR_ERR(hpage);
> + goto out;
> + }
> +
> + if (PageChecked(hpage)) {
> + extract_hash(hpage, hoffset, vi->hash_alg->digest_size,
> + _want_hash);
> + want_hash = _want_hash;
> + put_page(hpage);
> + pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page already checked, want
> %s:%*phN\n",
> + vi->hash_alg->name,
> + vi->hash_alg->digest_size,
> + want_hash);
> + break;
> + }
> + pr_debug_ratelimited("Hash page not yet checked\n");
> + hpages[level] = hpage;
> + hoffsets[level] = hoffset;
> + }
> +
> + if (!want_hash) {
> + want_hash = vi->root_hash;
> + pr_debug("Want root hash: %s:%*phN\n", vi->hash_alg->name,
> + vi->hash_alg->digest_size, want_hash);
> + }
> +
> + /* Descend the tree verifying hash pages */
> + for (; level > 0; level--) {
> + struct page *hpage = hpages[level - 1];
> + unsigned int hoffset = hoffsets[level - 1];
> +
> + err = hash_page(vi, req, hpage, real_hash);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> + err = compare_hashes(want_hash, real_hash,
> + vi->hash_alg->digest_size,
> + inode, index, level - 1,
> + vi->hash_alg->name);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> + SetPageChecked(hpage);
> + extract_hash(hpage, hoffset, vi->hash_alg->digest_size,
> + _want_hash);
> + want_hash = _want_hash;
> + put_page(hpage);
> + pr_debug("Verified hash page at level %d, now want %s:%*phN\n",
> + level - 1, vi->hash_alg->name,
> + vi->hash_alg->digest_size, want_hash);
> + }
> +
> + /* Finally, verify the data page */
> + err = hash_page(vi, req, data_page, real_hash);
> + if (err)
> + goto out;
> + err = compare_hashes(want_hash, real_hash, vi->hash_alg->digest_size,
> + inode, index, -1, vi->hash_alg->name);
> +out:
> + for (; level > 0; level--)
> + put_page(hpages[level - 1]);
> + if (err) {
> + pr_warn_ratelimited("Error verifying page; ino=%lu, index=%lu
> (err=%d)\n",
> + inode->i_ino, data_page->index, err);
> + return false;
> + }
> + return true;
> +}
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_verify_page - verify a data page
> + *
> + * Verify a page that has just been read from a file against that file's
> Merkle
> + * tree. The page is assumed to be a pagecache page.
> + *
> + * Return: true if the page is valid, else false.
> + */
> +bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *data_page)
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = data_page->mapping->host;
> + const struct fsverity_info *vi = get_fsverity_info(inode);
> + struct ahash_request *req;
> + bool valid;
> +
> + req = ahash_request_alloc(vi->hash_alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (unlikely(!req))
> + return false;
> +
> + valid = verify_page(inode, vi, req, data_page);
> +
> + ahash_request_free(req);
> +
> + return valid;
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_page);
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_verify_bio - verify a 'read' bio that has just completed
> + *
> + * Verify a set of pages that have just been read from a file against that
> + * file's Merkle tree. The pages are assumed to be pagecache pages. Pages
> that
> + * fail verification are set to the Error state. Verification is skipped for
> + * pages already in the Error state, e.g. due to fscrypt decryption failure.
> + */
> +void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
Hi Eric-
This kind of API won't work for remote filesystems, which do not use
"struct bio" to do their I/O. Could a remote filesystem solely use
fsverity_verify_page instead?
> +{
> + struct inode *inode = bio_first_page_all(bio)->mapping->host;
> + const struct fsverity_info *vi = get_fsverity_info(inode);
> + struct ahash_request *req;
> + struct bio_vec *bv;
> + int i;
> +
> + req = ahash_request_alloc(vi->hash_alg->tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (unlikely(!req)) {
> + bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, i)
> + SetPageError(bv->bv_page);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + bio_for_each_segment_all(bv, bio, i) {
> + struct page *page = bv->bv_page;
> +
> + if (!PageError(page) && !verify_page(inode, vi, req, page))
> + SetPageError(page);
> + }
> +
> + ahash_request_free(req);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_verify_bio);
> +
> +/**
> + * fsverity_enqueue_verify_work - enqueue work on the fs-verity workqueue
> + *
> + * Enqueue verification work for asynchronous processing.
> + */
> +void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
> +{
> + queue_work(fsverity_read_workqueue, work);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fsverity_enqueue_verify_work);
> diff --git a/include/linux/fsverity.h b/include/linux/fsverity.h
> index 3af55241046aa..56341f10aa965 100644
> --- a/include/linux/fsverity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/fsverity.h
> @@ -28,6 +28,11 @@ extern int fsverity_prepare_getattr(struct inode *inode);
> extern void fsverity_cleanup_inode(struct inode *inode);
> extern loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct inode *inode);
>
> +/* verify.c */
> +extern bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page);
> +extern void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio);
> +extern void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work);
> +
> #else /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */
>
> /* setup.c */
> @@ -57,6 +62,24 @@ static inline loff_t fsverity_full_i_size(const struct
> inode *inode)
> return i_size_read(inode);
> }
>
> +/* verify.c */
> +
> +static inline bool fsverity_verify_page(struct page *page)
> +{
> + WARN_ON(1);
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static inline void fsverity_verify_bio(struct bio *bio)
> +{
> + WARN_ON(1);
> +}
> +
> +static inline void fsverity_enqueue_verify_work(struct work_struct *work)
> +{
> + WARN_ON(1);
> +}
> +
> #endif /* !__FS_HAS_VERITY */
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_FSVERITY_H */
> --
> 2.18.0
>
--
Chuck Lever
chuckle...@gmail.com
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