Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> > > In fact, I'm not entirely happy with the acl_posix namespace, and after
> > > thinking about it consider the previous classification (user, inode,
> > > trusted, system) better. (This is also what Robert Watson suggested.)
> > >
> > > The different system attributes (ACLs, CAPs, MAC labels, etc.) could then
> > > be identified by attribute name, e.g., "acl.posix.access",
> > > "acl.posix.default", "acl.afs", "cap", etc.

I'm still concerned by the proposed CAP_TRUSTED thing. As with
capabilities, ACLs already have a 'POSIX.1e' restriction on being
manipulated. Adding CAP_TRUSTED to the capabilities needed to manipulate
any 'trusted' EA seems superfluous.

I'd probably be less concerned if this was just a 'default' behavior in
cases where the kernel didn't actually know what a "trusted:foo.bar" EA
was. But in the cases of ACL or full capability support, the presence of
specific kernel code to enforce the symantics of these EAs would replace
a capable(CAP_TRUSTED) test.

Thanks

Andrew
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