On Thu, Apr 21, 2005 at 09:33:20AM +0200, Jan Hudec wrote: > I think I can. And I think I can modify the proposal to something a bit > more sane. > > The problem is: The mount should be accessible only by processes started > by the authorized user, but not by other user, including root, who is > capable of changing their uid to the authorized user's id. > > The solution can be: The mount is only accessible to the process group > of that user's session. That's easy -- the login process is created > with new namespace.
That doesn't make sense. A process with sufficient capabilities (aka root) can do things including reading or modifying kernel memory and can access your namespace always, no matter how difficult you're trying to make it. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html