Miklos Szeredi <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> Arn't there ways to escape chroot jails? Serge had pointed me to a URL >> which showed chroots can be escaped. And if that is true than having all >> user's private mount tree in the same namespace can be a security issue? > > No. In fact chrooting the user into /share/$USER will actually > _grant_ a privilege to the user, instead of taking it away. It allows > the user to modify it's root namespace, which it wouldn't be able to > in the initial namespace. > > So even if the user could escape from the chroot (which I doubt), s/he > would not be able to do any harm, since unprivileged mounting would be > restricted to /share. Also /share/$USER should only have read/search > permission for $USER or no permissions at all, which would mean, that > other users' namespaces would be safe from tampering as well.
A couple of points. - chroot can be escaped, it is just a chdir for the root directory it is not a security feature. The only security is that you have to be root to call chdir. A carefully done namespace setup won't have that issue. - While it may not violate security as far as what a user is allowed to modify it may violate security as far as what a user is allowed to see. There are interesting per login cases as well such as allowing a user to replicate their mount tree from another machine when they log in. When /home is on a network filesystem this can be very practical and can allow propagation of mounts across machines not just across a single login session. Eric - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
