On Jun 09, 2007, at 13:32:05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, 9 Jun 2007, Kyle Moffett wrote:
On Jun 09, 2007, at 12:46:40, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
so as I understand this with SELinux you will have lots of labels
around your system (more as you lock down the system more) you
need to define policy so that your unrestricted users must have
access to every label, and every time you create a new label you
need to go back to all your policies to see if the new label
needs to be allowed from that policy
Actually, it's easier than that. There are type attributes which
may be assigned to an arbitrary set of types, and each "type"
field in an access rule may use either a type or an attribute. So
you don't actually need to modify existing rules when adding new
types, you just add the appropriate existing attributes to your
new type. For example, you could set up a "logfile" attribute
which allows logrotate to archive old versions and allows audit-
admin users to modify/delete them, then whenever you need to add a
new logfile you just declare the "my_foo_log_t" type to have the
"logfile" attribute.
isn't this just the flip side of the same problem?
every time you define a new attribute you need to go through all
the files and decide if the new attribute needs to be given to that
file.
No you don't, you can add attributes to a type after-the-fact. In
concept this problem is very similar to programming: You have
various documented interfaces used by different policy files to
interact with each other. As long as your policy files conform to
the documented interfaces then you *DONT* have to manually inspect
each file because you can make basic assumptions. On the other hand,
when you break that interface "contract" you will get very unexpected
results. For the above example:
My syslog policy file would create a "logfile" attribute and types
for "/var/log/auth/auth.log", "/var/log/kern/kern.log", and "/var/log/
messages". It would also create a "logdaemon" attribute which has
automatic type transitions to create files in different "/var/log/*"
directories Finally, it would allow the syslogd type to create and
append to its specific file types for "auth.log", "kern.log", and
"messages".
My logrotate policy file would depend on the syslog policy and would
declare the logrotate daemon type as a "logdaemon", and additionally
allow logrotate to read, rename, append, and delete "logfile" types.
Since logrotate is a "logdaemon", it already has the appropriate type
transitions for new types.
My samba policy file would depend on the syslog policy and would
declare the samba daemon type as a "logdaemon" and the "/var/log/
samba/*" type as a "logfile". Then it would add a type transition
rule so when "logdaemon" creates new files in "samba_log_dir_t", they
have the appropriate "samba_log_t" label. Finally, samba would allow
itself to append to "samba_log_t" files.
Note that now when "logrotate" runs and rotates files in /var/log/
samba, it will automatically create the new files with type
"samba_log_t", even though there are no *direct* associations between
those types. If the syslog policy file was poorly written it could
seriously adversely affect the security of the system, but hopefully
that's obvious :-D. Policy development is _hard_, it's a whole
separate state-machine and pseudo-programming-language that should
mostly be left to security professionals or very experienced
developers/sysadmins.
Cheers,
Kyle Moffett
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