--- Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On Fri, 2007-11-09 at 14:46 -0800, Casey Schaufler wrote: > > --- Eric Paris <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Adds security_get_sb_mnt_opts, security_set_sb_mnt_opts, and > > > security_clont_sb_mnt_opts to the LSM and to SELinux. This will allow > > > filesystems to directly own and control all of their mount options if > > > they so choose. > > > > I understand why you would want get_sb_mnt_opts(), but what > > is the value for set_sb_mnt_opts() and what is the purpose of > > clone_sb_mnt_opts()? > > set is really the most important one. NFS knows when it creates a > superblock (using SELinux as an example) that it wants to set > context=blah. Thus it calls into set_sb_mnt_opts with the flag for > "context=" and "blah." get_sb_mnt_opts will likely get used in the > future for /proc/mounts to be able to report the security options. > clone is really just to make it easy for the FS. If they know "i want > the new one to look like this old one" they can just call into clone_ > and don't have to worry about dealing freeing memory or anything like > that... > > > > > This interface deals only with option identifiers and > > > strings so it should generic enough for any LSM which may come in the > > > future. Filesystems which pass text mount data around in the kernel > > > (almost all of them) need not currently make use of this interface for > > > SELinux sake since it will still parse those strings as it always has. > > > > If SELinux is still dealing with strings on it's own what is > > the point of these hooks? > > The point is that not all filesystems use strings. NFS is the real in > kernel kicker. See things like fs/nfs/namespace.c:nfs_do_clone_mount() > where they pass a binary blob into the vfs which arrives to the LSM as a > binary blob which it cannot parse. (note NFS also uses > nfs_parsed_mount_data and nfs_mount_data)
Nothing like a real example to make your point. Yup, I see it. > Since the LSM can't (ok, "isn't allowed" according to previous > discussions with vfs/fs people) deal with those binary blobs to get its > options some method must be created for those filesystems to pass that > data in a usable way. > > > > > An LSM would need to implement these functions only if they had mount > > > time options, such as selinux has context= or fscontext=. If the LSM > > > has no mount time options they could simply not implement and let the > > > dummy ops take care of things. > > > > Smack and SELinux currently deal with options in sb_kern_mount(), with > > help from sb_copy_data(). Why change the implementation? > > I don't plan to change anything for any FS that passes text options, but > we aren't allowed to parse binary blobs (nor can we actually even know > for sure what blobs we are dealing with currently in the LSM even if we > were 'allowed' to parse them and get the needed data directly) Ick. > > > A LSM other than SELinux would need to define new option numbers in > > > security.h > > > > I don't think it is a good idea to require that LSM specific > > information be stored outside the scope of the LSM. > > Its either that or FS specific knowledge inside the LSM. See > security/selinux/hooks.c:try_context_mount() for an example of NFS > specific knowledge inside an LSM. This current implementation has bugs > since we don't know if *data is any of the 3 above named structs. This > patch doesn't fix those issues, but lays the groundwork for a fix... If the filesystem interface requires different behavior for different filesystem types I'd say it's broken, but given that that is the historical behavior I suppose we'll have to either live with it or suggest a better way. Looks as if that's your plan here. > > > (or could reuse if they have the same basic meaning I guess) > > > and any FS which decides to own there own security options would need to > > > be patched to use this new interface for every possible LSM. This is > > > because it was stated to me very clearly that LSM's should not attempt > > > to understand FS mount data and the burdon to understand security should > > > be in the FS which owns the options. > > > > Perhaps a mount option prefix then. "Smack.root", "SELinux.context", > > that sort of thing. An LSM writer shouldn't have to patch security.h > > every time she wants to add a mount option. > > I did originally namespace these things such as SELINUX__CONTEXT_MNT but > later wondered what the point was. If another LSM decided to somehow > make use of the same infrastructure in FS that have binary mount data > and they used context= they should be able to use a generic CONTEXT_MNT > rather than pretend that flag has some special meaning. It actually > works nicely for other LSMs since once I get finished with NFS it should > support 3 mount options which although maybe not named nicely for non > SELinux LSMs will be usable without any FS changes... I hear rumblings about reviving the notion of LSM stacking, in which case a limited number of shared mount options might not work so well. > And while I don't think its a great thing that every LSM is going to be > adding things to the generic security.h if they want things to work, > they are going to have to add things to the generic structures used by > filesystems which use binary mount data. Sorry if I sound ignorant/not-up-to-date/stoopid, but what about the notion of a mechanism to support generic mount options and FS specific ones such that the FS never sees anything but what it expects, but there's also a "blob" for other schemes, including LSMs? > We have this tight coupling of information. 3 options. > > 1) make the LSM very FS knowledgeable (what SELinux currently does for > NFS and is maybe not a great idea and has already been strongly pooped > on on list before) Not a good idea, I confess. > 2) make the FS know what LSM is running and what options it is allowed > to send (obviously a terrible unscalable mess if we have to do this for > more than NFS and we still need a get/set type interface) Again, I agree it's not pretty. > 3) make the interface generic and knowledgeable of everything so there > is little/no cross knowledge. If the FS happens to send an selinux mnt > opt flag to SMACK (say a user mounts his NFS filesystem with fscontext=^ > when running SMACK) then SMACK should return an EINVAL since it does not > implement such a thing. Ok, yes, I think I see. Since the FS "owns" the mount options it has to be the FS that calls security_<whatever> to pass along to the LSM. A FS developer who is uncooperative with LSM developers may choose not to pass along any or all LSM specific mount options, although it might be reasonable to expect that new filesystems would be expected to do so if they want to get mainlined. A new LSM would be expected to deal with existing mainline filesystems that do not pass along the mount options the LSM might want. By tackling NFS for SELinux you are providing the prototype of how the interaction ought to go forward from both the FS and LSM points of view. Thanks for the explaination. Casey Schaufler [EMAIL PROTECTED] - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-fsdevel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
