On 2/27/2024 10:19 AM, Kalle Valo wrote:
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo...@kernel.org> wrote:Fix boot crash on Raspberry Pi by moving the update to `event->datalen` before data is copied into flexible-array member `data` via `memcpy()`. Flexible-array member `data` was annotated with `__counted_by(datalen)` in commit 62d19b358088 ("wifi: brcmfmac: fweh: Add __counted_by for struct brcmf_fweh_queue_item and use struct_size()"). The intention of this is to gain visibility into the size of `data` at run-time through its _counter_ (in this case `datalen`), and with this have its accesses bounds-checked at run-time via CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE and CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS. To effectively accomplish the above, we shall update the counter (`datalen`), before the first access to the flexible array (`data`), which was also done in the mentioned commit. However, commit edec42821911 ("wifi: brcmfmac: allow per-vendor event handling") inadvertently caused a buffer overflow, detected by FORTIFY_SOURCE. It moved the `event->datalen = datalen;` update to after the first `data` access, at which point `event->datalen` was not yet updated from zero (after calling `kzalloc()`), leading to the overflow issue. This fix repositions the `event->datalen = datalen;` update before accessing `data`, restoring the intended buffer overflow protection. :) Fixes: edec42821911 ("wifi: brcmfmac: allow per-vendor event handling") Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <nat...@kernel.org> Closes: https://gist.github.com/nathanchance/e22f681f3bfc467f15cdf6605021aaa6 Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nat...@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo...@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org>Arend, ack?
Figured Kees Cook was the trumping authority here, but here it is: Acked-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspr...@broadcom.com> Gr. AvS
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