On Fri, Jul 19, 2024 at 11:14:27AM +0800, Jinjie Ruan wrote: > Add support of kernel stack offset randomization while handling syscall, > the offset is defaultly limited by KSTACK_OFFSET_MAX(). > > In order to avoid trigger stack canaries (due to __builtin_alloca) and > slowing down the entry path, use __no_stack_protector attribute to > disable stack protector for do_syscall() at function level. > > With this patch, the REPORT_STACK test show that: > `loongarch64 bits of stack entropy: 7`
I suspect this will report the correct "6" after now that this commit has landed: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=872bb37f6829d4f7f3ed5afe2786add3d4384b4b > > Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjin...@huawei.com> > Suggested-by: Huacai Chen <chenhua...@kernel.org> Thanks for adding this and getting it tested! Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <k...@kernel.org> -- Kees Cook
