On Fri, Oct 18, 2024 at 04:47:10PM +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
>
> Commit ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in
> remap_file_pages()") fixed a security issue, it added an LSM check when
> trying to remap file pages, so that LSMs have the opportunity to evaluate
> such action like for other memory operations such as mmap() and mprotect().
>
> However, that commit called security_mmap_file() inside the mmap_lock lock,
> while the other calls do it before taking the lock, after commit
> 8b3ec6814c83 ("take security_mmap_file() outside of ->mmap_sem").
>
> This caused lock inversion issue with IMA which was taking the mmap_lock
> and i_mutex lock in the opposite way when the remap_file_pages() system
> call was called.
>
> Solve the issue by splitting the critical region in remap_file_pages() in
> two regions: the first takes a read lock of mmap_lock and retrieves the VMA
> and the file associated, and calculate the 'prot' and 'flags' variable; the
> second takes a write lock on mmap_lock, checks that the VMA flags and the
> VMA file descriptor are the same as the ones obtained in the first critical
> region (otherwise the system call fails), and calls do_mmap().
>
> In between, after releasing the read lock and taking the write lock, call
> security_mmap_file(), and solve the lock inversion issue.

Great description!

>
> Cc: [email protected]
> Fixes: ea7e2d5e49c0 ("mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in 
> remap_file_pages()")
> Reported-by: [email protected]
> Closes: 
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/
> Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <[email protected]> (Calculate prot and 
> flags earlier)
> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>

Other than some nits below:

Reviewed-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <[email protected]>

I think you're definitely good to un-RFC here.

> ---
>  mm/mmap.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
>  1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
> index 9c0fb43064b5..762944427e03 100644
> --- a/mm/mmap.c
> +++ b/mm/mmap.c
> @@ -1640,6 +1640,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, start, 
> unsigned long, size,
>       unsigned long populate = 0;
>       unsigned long ret = -EINVAL;
>       struct file *file;
> +     vm_flags_t vm_flags;
>
>       pr_warn_once("%s (%d) uses deprecated remap_file_pages() syscall. See 
> Documentation/mm/remap_file_pages.rst.\n",
>                    current->comm, current->pid);
> @@ -1656,12 +1657,53 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, 
> start, unsigned long, size,
>       if (pgoff + (size >> PAGE_SHIFT) < pgoff)
>               return ret;
>
> -     if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm))
> +     if (mmap_read_lock_killable(mm))
> +             return -EINTR;

I'm kinda verbose generally, but I'd love a comment like:

        /*
         * Look up VMA under read lock first so we can perform the security
         * without holding locks (which can be problematic). We reacquire a
         * write lock later and check nothing changed underneath us.
         */

> +
> +     vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
> +
> +     if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED)) {
> +             mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> +             return -EINVAL;
> +     }
> +
> +     prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
> +     prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
> +     prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
> +
> +     flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
> +     flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
> +     if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
> +             flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
> +
> +     /* Save vm_flags used to calculate prot and flags, and recheck later. */
> +     vm_flags = vma->vm_flags;
> +     file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> +
> +     mmap_read_unlock(mm);
> +

Maybe worth adding a comment to explain why you're doing this without the
lock so somebody looking at this later can understand the dance?

> +     ret = security_mmap_file(file, prot, flags);
> +     if (ret) {
> +             fput(file);
> +             return ret;
> +     }
> +
> +     ret = -EINVAL;
> +

Again, being verbose, I'd put something here like:

        /* OK security check passed, take write lock + let it rip */

> +     if (mmap_write_lock_killable(mm)) {
> +             fput(file);
>               return -EINTR;
> +     }
>
>       vma = vma_lookup(mm, start);
>
> -     if (!vma || !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
> +     if (!vma)
> +             goto out;
> +

I'd also add something like:

        /* Make sure things didn't change under us. */

> +     if (vma->vm_flags != vm_flags)
> +             goto out;
> +

And drop this newline to group them together (super nitty I know, sorry!)

> +     if (vma->vm_file != file)
>               goto out;
>
>       if (start + size > vma->vm_end) {
> @@ -1689,25 +1731,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(remap_file_pages, unsigned long, 
> start, unsigned long, size,
>                       goto out;
>       }
>
> -     prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_READ ? PROT_READ : 0;
> -     prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE ? PROT_WRITE : 0;
> -     prot |= vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC ? PROT_EXEC : 0;
> -
> -     flags &= MAP_NONBLOCK;
> -     flags |= MAP_SHARED | MAP_FIXED | MAP_POPULATE;
> -     if (vma->vm_flags & VM_LOCKED)
> -             flags |= MAP_LOCKED;
> -
> -     file = get_file(vma->vm_file);
> -     ret = security_mmap_file(vma->vm_file, prot, flags);
> -     if (ret)
> -             goto out_fput;
>       ret = do_mmap(vma->vm_file, start, size,
>                       prot, flags, 0, pgoff, &populate, NULL);
> -out_fput:
> -     fput(file);
>  out:
>       mmap_write_unlock(mm);
> +     fput(file);
>       if (populate)
>               mm_populate(ret, populate);
>       if (!IS_ERR_VALUE(ret))
> --
> 2.34.1
>

These are just nits, this looks good to me!

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