The first write on the ima policy file permits to override the default
policy defined with the ima_policy= boot parameter. This can be done
by adding the /etc/ima/ima-policy which allows loading the custom policy
during boot. It is also possible to load custom policy at runtime through
file operations:
cp custom_ima_policy /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
cat custom_ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
or by writing the absolute path of the file containing the custom policy:
echo /path/of/custom_ima_policy > /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
In these cases, file signature can be necessary to load the policy
(func=POLICY_CHECK). Custom policy can also be set at runtime by directly
writing the policy stream on the ima policy file:
echo -e "measure func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
"audit func=BPRM_CHECK mask=MAY_EXEC\n" \
> /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy
In this case, there is no mechanism to verify the integrity of the new
policy.
Add a new entry in the ima measurements list containing the ascii custom
ima policy buffer when not verified at load time.
Signed-off-by: Enrico Bravi <[email protected]>
---
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 ++
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 11 ++++
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 81 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index c0d3b716d11f..27cba2e612a5 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8, TPM_PCR10 = 10 };
/* current content of the policy */
extern int ima_policy_flag;
+extern bool override_ima_policy;
+
/* bitset of digests algorithms allowed in the setxattr hook */
extern atomic_t ima_setxattr_allowed_hash_algorithms;
@@ -414,6 +416,7 @@ void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos);
void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos);
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
+void ima_measure_override_policy(size_t file_len);
/* Appraise integrity measurements */
#define IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE 0x01
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index e4a79a9b2d58..8c516de4aebe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -309,6 +309,9 @@ static const struct file_operations
ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
.release = seq_release,
};
+static size_t text_policy_len;
+bool override_ima_policy;
+
static ssize_t ima_read_policy(char *path)
{
void *data = NULL;
@@ -383,6 +386,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const
char __user *buf,
result = -EACCES;
} else {
result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+ text_policy_len += (result + 1);
}
mutex_unlock(&ima_write_mutex);
out_free:
@@ -532,6 +536,10 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct
file *file)
}
ima_update_policy();
+ if (unlikely(override_ima_policy && text_policy_len)) {
+ ima_measure_override_policy(text_policy_len);
+ override_ima_policy = false;
+ }
#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
ima_policy = NULL;
@@ -558,6 +566,9 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists = NULL;
binary_securityfs_measurement_lists = NULL;
+ text_policy_len = 0;
+ override_ima_policy = false;
+
ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir);
if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
return PTR_ERR(ima_dir);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 21a8e54c383f..34753bce4668 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include "ima.h"
@@ -1044,6 +1045,8 @@ void ima_update_policy(void)
if (ima_rules != (struct list_head __rcu *)policy) {
ima_policy_flag = 0;
+ override_ima_policy = true;
+
rcu_assign_pointer(ima_rules, policy);
/*
* IMA architecture specific policy rules are specified
@@ -1982,7 +1985,6 @@ const char *const func_tokens[] = {
__ima_hooks(__ima_hook_stringify)
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
enum {
mask_exec = 0, mask_write, mask_read, mask_append
};
@@ -1994,6 +1996,7 @@ static const char *const mask_tokens[] = {
"^MAY_APPEND"
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
loff_t l = *pos;
@@ -2028,6 +2031,7 @@ void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t
*pos)
void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
#define pt(token) policy_tokens[token].pattern
#define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
@@ -2276,7 +2280,6 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, "\n");
return 0;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
#if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING)
/*
@@ -2333,3 +2336,77 @@ bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id id)
return found;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE && CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING */
+
+void ima_measure_override_policy(size_t file_len)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache iint = {};
+ const char event_name[] = "ima-policy-override";
+ struct ima_event_data event_data = {.iint = &iint,
+ .filename = event_name};
+ struct ima_max_digest_data hash;
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash_hdr = container_of(&hash.hdr,
+ struct ima_digest_data, hdr);
+ static const char op[] = "measure_ima_policy_override";
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry = NULL;
+ static char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+ struct ima_template_desc *template;
+ struct ima_rule_entry *rule_entry;
+ struct list_head *ima_rules_tmp;
+ struct seq_file file;
+ int result = -ENOMEM;
+ int violation = 0;
+
+ file.buf = vmalloc(file_len);
+ if (!file.buf)
+ goto out;
+
+ file.read_pos = 0;
+ file.size = file_len;
+ file.count = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ ima_rules_tmp = rcu_dereference(ima_rules);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(rule_entry, ima_rules_tmp, list) {
+ ima_policy_show(&file, rule_entry);
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ event_data.buf = file.buf;
+ event_data.buf_len = file.count;
+
+ template = ima_template_desc_buf();
+ if (!template) {
+ audit_cause = "ima_template_desc_buf";
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ iint.ima_hash = hash_hdr;
+ iint.ima_hash->algo = ima_hash_algo;
+ iint.ima_hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
+
+ result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(file.buf, file.count, iint.ima_hash);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry, template);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "alloc_entry";
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
+ result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL, event_data.buf,
+ CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "store_entry";
+ ima_free_template_entry(entry);
+ }
+
+out_free:
+ kvfree(file.buf);
+out:
+ if (result < 0)
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, event_name,
+ op, audit_cause, result, 1);
+}
base-commit: ffd294d346d185b70e28b1a28abe367bbfe53c04
--
2.47.1
