On Mon, 2025-12-29 at 11:52 -0600, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> Since commit 1cf7e834a6fb ("xfs: switch to multigrain timestamps"), IMA
> is no longer able to correctly track inode.i_version due to the struct
> kstat.change_cookie no longer containing an updated i_version.
> 
> Introduce a fallback mechanism for IMA that instead tracks a
> integrity_ctime_guard() in absence of or outdated i_version
> for stacked file systems.
> 
> EVM is left alone since it mostly cares about the backing inode.
> 
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/aTspr4_h9IU4EyrR@CMGLRV3
> Fixes: 1cf7e834a6fb ("xfs: switch to multigrain timestamps")
> Suggested-by: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <[email protected]>
> ---
> The motivation behind this was that file systems that use the
> cookie to set the i_version for stacked file systems may still do so.
> Then add in the ctime_guard as a fallback if there's a detected change.
> The assumption is that the ctime will be different if the i_version is
> different anyway for non-stacked file systems.
> 
> I'm not too pleased with passing in struct file* to
> integrity_inode_attrs_changed() since EVM doesn't currently use
> that for now, but I couldn't come up with another idea to get the
> stat without coming up with a new stat function to accommodate just
> the file path, fully separate out IMA/EVM checks, or lastly add stacked
> file system support to EVM (which doesn't make much sense to me
> at the moment).
> 
> I plan on adding in self test infrastructure for the v1, but I would
> like to get some early feedback on the approach first.
> ---
>  include/linux/integrity.h           | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  2 +-
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c    | 21 +++++++++++++++------
>  security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   | 17 ++++++++++-------
>  5 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
> index 
> f5842372359be5341b6870a43b92e695e8fc78af..4964c0f2bbda0ca450d135b9b738bc92256c375a
>  100644
> --- a/include/linux/integrity.h
> +++ b/include/linux/integrity.h
> @@ -31,19 +31,27 @@ static inline void integrity_load_keys(void)
>  
>  /* An inode's attributes for detection of changes */
>  struct integrity_inode_attributes {
> +     u64 ctime_guard;
>       u64 version;            /* track inode changes */
>       unsigned long ino;
>       dev_t dev;
>  };
>  
> +static inline u64 integrity_ctime_guard(struct kstat stat)
> +{
> +     return stat.ctime.tv_sec ^ stat.ctime.tv_nsec;
> +}
> +
>  /*
>   * On stacked filesystems the i_version alone is not enough to detect file 
> data
>   * or metadata change. Additional metadata is required.
>   */
>  static inline void
>  integrity_inode_attrs_store(struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
> -                         u64 i_version, const struct inode *inode)
> +                         u64 i_version, u64 ctime_guard,
> +                         const struct inode *inode)
>  {
> +     attrs->ctime_guard = ctime_guard;
>       attrs->version = i_version;
>       attrs->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev;
>       attrs->ino = inode->i_ino;
> @@ -54,11 +62,22 @@ integrity_inode_attrs_store(struct 
> integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
>   */
>  static inline bool
>  integrity_inode_attrs_changed(const struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs,
> -                           const struct inode *inode)
> +                           struct file *file, struct inode *inode)
>  {
> -     return (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev ||
> -             inode->i_ino != attrs->ino ||
> -             !inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version));
> +     struct kstat stat;
> +
> +     if (inode->i_sb->s_dev != attrs->dev ||
> +         inode->i_ino != attrs->ino)
> +             return true;
> +
> +     if (inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version))
> +             return false;
> +
> +     if (!file || vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CTIME,
> +                                    AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT))
> +             return true;
> +

This is rather odd. You're sampling the i_version field directly, but
if it's not equal then you go through ->getattr() to get the ctime.

It's particularly odd since you don't know whether the i_version field
is even implemented on the fs. On filesystems where it isn't, the
i_version field generally stays at 0, so won't this never fall through
to do the vfs_getattr_nosec() call on those filesystems?

Ideally, you should just call vfs_getattr_nosec() early on with
STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE|STATX_CTIME to get both at once, and only trust
STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE if it's set in the returned mask.

> +     return attrs->ctime_guard != integrity_ctime_guard(stat);
>  }
>  
>  
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c 
> b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> index 
> a5e730ffda57fbc0a91124adaa77b946a12d08b4..2d89c0e8d9360253f8dad52d2a8168127bb4d3b8
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
> @@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry,
>               if (IS_I_VERSION(inode))
>                       i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode);
>               integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->metadata_inode, i_version,
> -                                         inode);
> +                                         0, inode);
>       }
>  
>       /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> index 
> 73d500a375cb37a54f295b0e1e93fd6e5d9ecddc..0712802628fd6533383f9855687e19bef7b771c7
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
> @@ -754,7 +754,7 @@ bool evm_metadata_changed(struct inode *inode, struct 
> inode *metadata_inode)
>       if (iint) {
>               ret = (!IS_I_VERSION(metadata_inode) ||
>                      integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->metadata_inode,
> -                                                  metadata_inode));
> +                            NULL, metadata_inode));
>               if (ret)
>                       iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
>       }
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 
> c35ea613c9f8d404ba4886e3b736c3bab29d1668..72bba8daa588a0f4e45e4249276edb54ca3d77ef
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, 
> struct file *file,
>       int length;
>       void *tmpbuf;
>       u64 i_version = 0;
> +     u64 ctime_guard = 0;
>  
>       /*
>        * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected
> @@ -272,10 +273,16 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache 
> *iint, struct file *file,
>        * to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit, but was modified to
>        * assume the file changed.
>        */
> -     result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat, STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
> +     result = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> +                                STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE | STATX_CTIME,
>                                  AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
> -     if (!result && (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE))
> -             i_version = stat.change_cookie;
> +     if (!result) {
> +             if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE)
> +                     i_version = stat.change_cookie;
> +
> +             if (stat.result_mask & STATX_CTIME)
> +                     ctime_guard = integrity_ctime_guard(stat);
> +     }
>       hash.hdr.algo = algo;
>       hash.hdr.length = hash_digest_size[algo];
>  
> @@ -305,11 +312,13 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache 
> *iint, struct file *file,
>  
>       iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf;
>       memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length);
> -     if (real_inode == inode)
> +     if (real_inode == inode) {
>               iint->real_inode.version = i_version;
> -     else
> +             iint->real_inode.ctime_guard = ctime_guard;
> +     } else {
>               integrity_inode_attrs_store(&iint->real_inode, i_version,
> -                                         real_inode);
> +                             ctime_guard, real_inode);
> +     }
>  
>       /* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */
>       if (!result)
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c 
> b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> index 
> 5770cf691912aa912fc65280c59f5baac35dd725..6051ea4a472fc0b0dd7b4e81da36eff8bd048c62
>  100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/mount.h>
>  #include <linux/mman.h>
>  #include <linux/slab.h>
> +#include <linux/stat.h>
>  #include <linux/xattr.h>
>  #include <linux/ima.h>
>  #include <linux/fs.h>
> @@ -185,6 +186,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache 
> *iint,
>  {
>       fmode_t mode = file->f_mode;
>       bool update;
> +     int ret;
>  
>       if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE))
>               return;
> @@ -197,12 +199,13 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct ima_iint_cache 
> *iint,
>  
>               update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR,
>                                           &iint->atomic_flags);
> -             if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) ||
> -                 vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> -                                   STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE,
> -                                   AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT) ||
> -                 !(stat.result_mask & STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE) ||
> -                 stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version) {
> +             ret = vfs_getattr_nosec(&file->f_path, &stat,
> +                                     STATX_CHANGE_COOKIE | STATX_CTIME,
> +                                     AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT);
> +             if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) || ret ||
> +                 (!ret && stat.change_cookie != iint->real_inode.version) ||
> +                 (!ret && integrity_ctime_guard(stat) !=
> +                  iint->real_inode.ctime_guard)) {
>                       iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
>                       iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
>                       if (update)
> @@ -330,7 +333,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const 
> struct cred *cred,
>           (action & IMA_DO_MASK) && (iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK)) {
>               if (!IS_I_VERSION(real_inode) ||
>                   integrity_inode_attrs_changed(&iint->real_inode,
> -                                               real_inode)) {
> +                                               file, real_inode)) {
>                       iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
>                       iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
>               }
> 
> ---
> base-commit: 8f0b4cce4481fb22653697cced8d0d04027cb1e8
> change-id: 20251212-xfs-ima-fixup-931780a62c2c
> 
> Best regards,

-- 
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

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