4.2.8-ckt3 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
---8<------------------------------------------------------------ From: Trond Myklebust <trond.mykleb...@primarydata.com> commit 5c5fc09a1157a11dbe84e6421c3e0b37d05238cb upstream. Donald Buczek reports that NFS clients can also report incorrect results for access() due to lack of revalidation of attributes before calling execute_ok(). Looking closely, it seems chdir() is afflicted with the same problem. Fix is to ensure we call nfs_revalidate_inode_rcu() or nfs_revalidate_inode() as appropriate before deciding to trust execute_ok(). Reported-by: Donald Buczek <buc...@molgen.mpg.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1451331530-3748-1-git-send-email-buc...@molgen.mpg.de Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.mykleb...@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa <ka...@canonical.com> --- fs/nfs/dir.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/nfs/dir.c b/fs/nfs/dir.c index 40d0dc6..fccbda7 100644 --- a/fs/nfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/nfs/dir.c @@ -2443,6 +2443,20 @@ int nfs_may_open(struct inode *inode, struct rpc_cred *cred, int openflags) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(nfs_may_open); +static int nfs_execute_ok(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode); + int ret; + + if (mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK) + ret = nfs_revalidate_inode_rcu(server, inode); + else + ret = nfs_revalidate_inode(server, inode); + if (ret == 0 && !execute_ok(inode)) + ret = -EACCES; + return ret; +} + int nfs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { struct rpc_cred *cred; @@ -2495,8 +2509,8 @@ force_lookup: res = PTR_ERR(cred); } out: - if (!res && (mask & MAY_EXEC) && !execute_ok(inode)) - res = -EACCES; + if (!res && (mask & MAY_EXEC)) + res = nfs_execute_ok(inode, mask); dfprintk(VFS, "NFS: permission(%s/%lu), mask=0x%x, res=%d\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, mask, res); -- 1.9.1
