Hi!
> SLIM implements dynamic process labels, so when a process
> is demoted, we must be able to revoke write access to some
> resources to which it has previously valid handles.
> For example, if a shell reads an untrusted file, the
> shell is demoted, and write access to more trusted files
> revoked. Based on previous comments on lkml, we understand
> that this is not really possible in general, so SLIM only
> attempts to revoke access in certain simple cases.
Are you saying that SLIM is useless by design because interested
parties can work around it?
Pavel
--
Thanks for all the (sleeping) penguins.
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