On Sat, 2016-06-11 at 22:06 -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> On Jun 11, 2016, at 9:33 PM, Jeff Layton wrote:
>
> > On Sat, 2016-06-11 at 11:41 -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> > > On Jun 10, 2016, at 4:55 PM, J . Bruce Fields wrote:
> > >
> > > > On Fri, Jun 10, 2016 at 06:50:33AM -0400, Jeff Layton wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, 2016-06-10 at 00:18 -0400, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> > > > > > On Jun 9, 2016, at 5:01 PM, Oleg Drokin wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Currently there's an unprotected access mode check in
> > > > > > > nfs4_upgrade_open
> > > > > > > that then calls nfs4_get_vfs_file which in turn assumes whatever
> > > > > > > access mode was present in the state is still valid which is racy.
> > > > > > > Two nfs4_get_vfs_file van enter the same path as result and get
> > > > > > > two
> > > > > > > references to nfs4_file, but later drop would only happens once
> > > > > > > because
> > > > > > > access mode is only denoted by bits, so no refcounting.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The locking around access mode testing is introduced to avoid this
> > > > > > > race.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Signed-off-by: Oleg Drokin <gr...@linuxhacker.ru>
> > > > > > > ---
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > This patch performs equally well to the st_rwsem -> mutex
> > > > > > > conversion,
> > > > > > > but is a bit ligher-weight I imagine.
> > > > > > > For one it seems to allow truncates in parallel if we ever want
> > > > > > > it.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > > > > > > 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > diff --git a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > > > > > > index f5f82e1..d4b9eba 100644
> > > > > > > --- a/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > > > > > > +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c
> > > > > > > @@ -3958,6 +3958,11 @@ static __be32 nfs4_get_vfs_file(struct
> > > > > > > svc_rqst *rqstp, struct nfs4_file *fp,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock);
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > + if (test_access(open->op_share_access, stp)) {
> > > > > > > + spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock);
> > > > > > > + return nfserr_eagain;
> > > > > > > + }
> > > > > > > +
> > > > > > > /*
> > > > > > > * Are we trying to set a deny mode that would conflict with
> > > > > > > * current access?
> > > > > > > @@ -4017,11 +4022,21 @@ nfs4_upgrade_open(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> > > > > > > struct nfs4_file *fp, struct svc_fh *c
> > > > > > > __be32 status;
> > > > > > > unsigned char old_deny_bmap = stp->st_deny_bmap;
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > - if (!test_access(open->op_share_access, stp))
> > > > > > > - return nfs4_get_vfs_file(rqstp, fp, cur_fh, stp,
> > > > > > > open);
> > > > > > > +again:
> > > > > > > + spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock);
> > > > > > > + if (!test_access(open->op_share_access, stp)) {
> > > > > > > + spin_unlock(&fp->fi_lock);
> > > > > > > + status = nfs4_get_vfs_file(rqstp, fp, cur_fh, stp,
> > > > > > > open);
> > > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > > + * Somebody won the race for access while we did
> > > > > > > not hold
> > > > > > > + * the lock here
> > > > > > > + */
> > > > > > > + if (status == nfserr_eagain)
> > > > > > > + goto again;
> > > > > > > + return status;
> > > > > > > + }
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > /* test and set deny mode */
> > > > > > > - spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock);
> > > > > > > status = nfs4_file_check_deny(fp, open->op_share_deny);
> > > > > > > if (status == nfs_ok) {
> > > > > > > set_deny(open->op_share_deny, stp);
> > > > > > > @@ -4361,6 +4376,13 @@ nfsd4_process_open2(struct svc_rqst *rqstp,
> > > > > > > struct svc_fh *current_fh, struct nf
> > > > > > > status = nfs4_get_vfs_file(rqstp, fp, current_fh, stp,
> > > > > > > open);
> > > > > > > if (status) {
> > > > > > > up_read(&stp->st_rwsem);
> > > > > > > + /*
> > > > > > > + * EAGAIN is returned when there's a
> > > > > > > racing access,
> > > > > > > + * this should never happen as we are the
> > > > > > > only user
> > > > > > > + * of this new state, and since it's not
> > > > > > > yet hashed,
> > > > > > > + * nobody can find it
> > > > > > > + */
> > > > > > > + WARN_ON(status == nfserr_eagain);
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Ok, some more testing shows that this CAN happen.
> > > > > > So this patch is inferior to the mutex one after all.
> > > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Yeah, that can happen for all sorts of reasons. As Andrew pointed out,
> > > > > you can get this when there is a lease break in progress, and that may
> > > > > be occurring for a completely different stateid (or because of samba,
> > > > > etc...)
> > > > >
> > > > > It may be possible to do something like this, but we'd need to audit
> > > > > all of the handling of st_access_bmap (and the deny bmap) to ensure
> > > > > that we get it right.
> > > > >
> > > > > For now, I think just turning that rwsem into a mutex is the best
> > > > > solution. That is a per-stateid mutex so any contention is going to be
> > > > > due to the client sending racing OPEN calls for the same inode anyway.
> > > > > Allowing those to run in parallel again could be useful in some cases,
> > > > > but most use-cases won't be harmed by that serialization.
> > > >
> > > > OK, so for now my plan is to take "nfsd: Always lock state exclusively"
> > > > for 4.7. Thanks to both of you for your work on this….
> > >
> > >
> > > FYI, I just hit this again with the "Always lock state exclusively" patch
> > > too.
> > > I hate when that happens. But it is much harder to hit now.
> > >
> > > the trace is also in the nfs4_get_vfs_file() that's called directly from
> > > nfsd4_process_open2().
> > >
> > > Otherwise the symptoms are pretty same - first I get the warning in
> > > set_access
> > > that the flag is already set and then the nfsd4_free_file_rcu() one and
> > > then
> > > unmount of underlying fs fails.
> > >
> > > What's strange is I am not sure what else can set the flag.
> > > Basically set_access is called from nfs4_get_vfs_file() - under the mutex
> > > via
> > > nfsd4_process_open2() directly or via nfs4_upgrade_open()...,
> > > or from get_lock_access() - without the mutex, but my workload does not
> > > do any
> > > file locking, so it should not really be hitting, right?
> > >
> > >
> > > Ah! I think I see it.
> > > This patch has the same problem as the spinlock moving one:
> > > When we call nfs4_get_vfs_file() directly from nfsd4_process_open2(),
> > > there's no
> > > check for anything, so supposed we take this diret cllign path, there's a
> > > mutex_lock() just before the call, but what's to stop another thread from
> > > finding
> > > this stateid meanwhile and being first with the mutex and then also
> > > settign the
> > > access mode that our first thread no longer sets?
> > > This makes it so that in fact we can never skip the access mode testing
> > > unless
> > > testing and setting is atomically done under the same lock which it is
> > > not now.
> > > The patch that extended the coverage of the fi_lock got that right, I did
> > > not hit
> > > any leaks there, just the "unhandled EAGAIN" warn on, which is wrong in
> > > it's own right.
> > > The surprising part is that the state that's not yet been through
> > > find_or_hash_clnt_odstate could still be found by somebody else? Is it
> > > really
> > > supposed to work like that?
> > >
> > > So if we are to check the access mode at all times in nfs4_get_vfs_file(),
> > > and return eagain, should we just check for that (all under the same
> > > lock if we go with the mutex patch) and call into nfs4_upgrade_open in
> > > that
> > > case again?
> > > Or I guess it's even better if we resurrect the fi_lock coverage
> > > extension patch and
> > > do it there, as that would mean at least the check and set are atomic wrt
> > > locking?
> >
> > Good catch. Could we fix this by locking the mutex before hashing the
> > new stateid (and having init_open_stateid return with it locked if it
> > finds an existing one?).
>
> Hm. I am trying to lock the newly initialized one and that seems to be
> holding up
> well (but I want 24 hours just to be extra sure).
> Hn, I just noticed a bug in this, so that'll reset the clock back.
>
> But I think we cannot return with locked one if we found existing one due to
> lock
> inversion?
> I see that normally first we lock the state rwsem (now mutex) and then
> lock the fi_lock.
> Now if we make init_open_stateid() to lock the new state mutex while the
> fi_lock
> is locked - that's probably ok, because we can do it before adding it to the
> list,
> so nobody can find it.
> Now the existing state that we find, we cannot really lock while holding that
> fi_lock,
> because what if there's a parallel thread that already holds the mutex and now
> wants the fi_lock?
> And so it's probably best to return with existing state unlocked and let
> caller lock it?
> Or do you think it's best to separately lock the found stp outside of spinlock
> just for consistency?
I think we just have to ensure that if the new stateid is hashed that
its mutex is locked prior to being inserted into the hashtable. That
should prevent the race you mentioned.
If we find an existing one in the hashtable in init_open_stateid, then
we _can_ take the mutex after dropping the spinlocks, since we won't
call release_open_stateid in that case anyway.
We'll also need to consider what happens if nfs4_get_vfs_file fails
after we hashed the stateid, but then another task finds it while
processing another open. So we might have to have release_open_stateid
unlock the mutex after unhashing the stateid, but before putting the
reference, and then have init_open_stateid check to see if the thing is
still hashed after it gets the mutex.
--
Jeff Layton <jlay...@poochiereds.net>
