* Andi Kleen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > sys_exec and other security boundaries must be synchronous > > only and not allow async "spill over" (consider setuid async binary > > patching) > > He probably would need some generalization of Andrea's seccomp work. > Perhaps using bitmaps? For paranoia I would suggest to white list, not > black list calls.
what i've implemented in my tree is sys_async_call_table[] which is a copy of sys_call_table[] with certain entries modified (by architecture level code, not by kernel/async.c) to sys_ni_syscall(). It's up to the architecture to decide which syscalls are allowed. but i could use a bitmap too - whatever linear construct. [ I'm not sure there's much connection to seccomp - seccomp uses a NULL terminated whitelist - while syslets would use most of the entries (and would not want to have the overhead of checking a blacklist). ] Ingo - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/