3.16.39-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>

commit 9b4d008787f864f17d008c9c15bbe8a0f7e2fc24 upstream.

Since systemd is consistently using /dev/urandom before it is
initialized, we can't see the other potentially dangerous users of
/dev/urandom immediately after boot.  So print the first ten such
complaints instead.

Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/char/random.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1379,12 +1379,16 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __us
 static ssize_t
 urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+       static int maxwarn = 10;
        int ret;
 
-       if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0))
-               printk_once(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s urandom read "
-                           "with %d bits of entropy available\n",
-                           current->comm, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total);
+       if (unlikely(nonblocking_pool.initialized == 0) &&
+           maxwarn > 0) {
+               maxwarn--;
+               printk(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s: uninitialized urandom read "
+                      "(%zd bytes read, %d bits of entropy available)\n",
+                      current->comm, nbytes, nonblocking_pool.entropy_total);
+       }
 
        nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
        ret = extract_entropy_user(&nonblocking_pool, buf, nbytes);

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