On Tue, Nov 15, 2016 at 11:16 AM, Peter Zijlstra <pet...@infradead.org> wrote: > > > On 15 November 2016 19:06:28 CET, Kees Cook <keesc...@chromium.org> wrote: > >>I'll want to modify this in the future; I have a config already doing >>"Bug on data structure corruption" that makes the warn/bug choice. >>It'll need some massaging to fit into the new refcount_t checks, but >>it should be okay -- there needs to be a way to complete the >>saturation, etc, but still kill the offending process group. > > Ideally we'd create a new WARN like construct that continues in kernel space > and terminates the process on return to user. That way there would be minimal > kernel state corruption.
Right, though I'd like to be conservative about the kernel execution continuing... I'll experiment with it. -Kees -- Kees Cook Nexus Security
