On Thu, 08 Dec, at 12:30:45PM, David Howells wrote:
> Get the firmware's secure-boot status in the kernel boot wrapper and stash
> it somewhere that the main kernel image can find.
> 
> The efi_get_secureboot() function is extracted from the arm stub and (a)
> generalised so that it can be called from x86 and (b) made to use
> efi_call_runtime() so that it can be run in mixed-mode.
> 
> Suggested-by: Lukas Wunner <[email protected]>
> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]>
> ---
> 
>  Documentation/x86/zero-page.txt           |    2 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/eboot.c          |    2 +
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S        |    1 
>  arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S        |    1 
>  arch/x86/include/asm/bootparam_utils.h    |    5 +-
>  arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/bootparam.h     |    3 +
>  arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c             |    1 
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile     |    2 -
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/arm-stub.c   |   63 
> +++--------------------------
>  drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c |   63 
> +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/linux/efi.h                       |    8 ++++
>  11 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
>  create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c
 
[...]

> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S 
> b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
> index d85b9625e836..c635f7e32f5c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_32.S
> @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
>  
>       __HEAD
>  ENTRY(startup_32)
> +     movb    $0, BP_secure_boot(%esi)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
>       jmp     preferred_addr
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S 
> b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> index beab8322f72a..ccd2c7461b7f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S
> @@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ ENTRY(startup_64)
>        * that maps our entire kernel(text+data+bss+brk), zero page
>        * and command line.
>        */
> +     movb    $0, BP_secure_boot(%rsi)
>  #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_STUB
>       /*
>        * The entry point for the PE/COFF executable is efi_pe_entry, so

Is clearing ::secure_boot really necessary? Any code path that goes
via efi_main() will set it correctly and all other code paths should
get it cleared in sanitize_boot_params(), no?

> diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
> index c7904556d7a8..92e23f03045e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/efi.h
> +++ b/include/linux/efi.h
> @@ -1477,6 +1477,14 @@ efi_status_t efi_setup_gop(efi_system_table_t 
> *sys_table_arg,
>  bool efi_runtime_disabled(void);
>  extern void efi_call_virt_check_flags(unsigned long flags, const char *call);
>  
> +enum efi_secureboot_mode {
> +     efi_secureboot_mode_unset,
> +     efi_secureboot_mode_unknown,
> +     efi_secureboot_mode_disabled,
> +     efi_secureboot_mode_enabled,
> +};
> +enum efi_secureboot_mode efi_get_secureboot(efi_system_table_t *sys_table);
> +
>  /*
>   * Arch code can implement the following three template macros, avoiding
>   * reptition for the void/non-void return cases of {__,}efi_call_virt():
> 

What's the distinction between the unset and unknown enums?

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