3.16.42-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Al Viro <[email protected]>

commit 137d01df511b3afe1f05499aea05f3bafc0fb221 upstream.

What happens is that a write to /dev/sg is given a request with non-zero
->iovec_count combined with zero ->dxfer_len.  Or with ->dxferp pointing
to an array full of empty iovecs.

Having write permission to /dev/sg shouldn't be equivalent to the
ability to trigger BUG_ON() while holding spinlocks...

Found by Dmitry Vyukov and syzkaller.

[ The BUG_ON() got changed to a WARN_ON_ONCE(), but this fixes the
  underlying issue.  - Linus ]

Signed-off-by: Al Viro <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <[email protected]>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: we're not using iov_iter, but can check the
 byte length after truncation]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <[email protected]>
---
 drivers/scsi/sg.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

--- a/drivers/scsi/sg.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sg.c
@@ -1716,6 +1716,10 @@ static int sg_start_req(Sg_request *srp,
                        iov_count = iov_shorten(iov, iov_count, hp->dxfer_len);
                        len = hp->dxfer_len;
                }
+               if (len == 0) {
+                       kfree(iov);
+                       return -EINVAL;
+               }
 
                res = blk_rq_map_user_iov(q, rq, md, (struct sg_iovec *)iov,
                                          iov_count,

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