3.16.42-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------ From: Ilya Dryomov <idryo...@gmail.com> commit 5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 upstream. After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b), the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks. The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(), ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never invoked by the the messenger. AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph: negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol"). The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill it in the next commit. Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryo...@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <s...@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <b...@decadent.org.uk> --- net/ceph/messenger.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) --- a/net/ceph/messenger.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger.c @@ -1977,6 +1977,19 @@ static int process_connect(struct ceph_c dout("process_connect on %p tag %d\n", con, (int)con->in_tag); + if (con->auth_reply_buf) { + /* + * Any connection that defines ->get_authorizer() + * should also define ->verify_authorizer_reply(). + * See get_connect_authorizer(). + */ + ret = con->ops->verify_authorizer_reply(con, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + con->error_msg = "bad authorize reply"; + return ret; + } + } + switch (con->in_reply.tag) { case CEPH_MSGR_TAG_FEATURES: pr_err("%s%lld %s feature set mismatch,"