On Mon, Feb 12, 2007 at 12:15:28AM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> +/*
> + * Rules: you can only create a container if
> + * 1. you are capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
> + * 2. the target container is a descendant of your own container
> + */
> +static int ns_create(struct container_subsys *ss, struct container *cont)
> +{
> + struct nscont *ns;
> +
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + return -EPERM;
Does this check break existing namespace semantics in a subtle way?
It now requires that unshare() of namespaces by any task requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities.
clone(.., CLONE_NEWUTS, ..)->copy_namespaces()->ns_container_clone()->
->container_clone()-> .. -> container_create() -> ns_create()
Earlier, one could unshare his uts namespace w/o CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capabilities. Now it is required. Is that fine? Don't know.
I feel we can avoid this check totally and let the directory permissions
take care of these checks.
Serge, what do you think?
--
Regards,
vatsa
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